Fonteyne: The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Interven

THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCTRINE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
ITS CURRENT VALIDITY UNDER THE
U.N. CHARTER
JEAN-PIERRE L. FONTEYNE*
The Indian action in the 1971 Bangladesh crisis' has recently revived the debate among scholars on the question of the
legality of unilateral2 humanitarian 3 intervention 4 under the U.N.
Charter.
* Lecturer in Law, University of the West Indies, Faculty of Law. J.D.,
State University of Ghent; LL.M., University of Virginia, School of Law.
The assistance of Professor Richard B. Lillich is gratefully acknowledged.
All textual translations were provided by the author.
1. See generally INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, THE EVENTS IN EAST PAKnsr~AN,

1971 (1972) [hereinafter cited as

INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS];

Nanda, A

Critique of the United Nations Inaction in the Bangladesh Crisis, 49 DENVER
L. J. 53 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Nanda, Critique]; Nanda, Self-Determination
in InternationalLaw: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities-Islamabad(West Pakistan)
and Dacca (East Pakistan) 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 321 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Nanda, Self-Determination]; Documents: Civil War in Pakistan, 4 N. Y. U. J.
INT'L & POL. 524 (1971).
2. Throughout this article the term unilateral intervention will be used as
a generic term to denote intervention either by a single State (individual intervention) or by a group of States (collective intervention). Recent examples of
the former are provided by the 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary, the 1958
U.S. intervention in Lebanon, the 1969 British "mini-intervention" in Anguilla,
and the Indian intervention in East Pakistan. The latter can be illustrated by
the joint French-British-Israeli intervention in the 1956 Suez crisis, the SEATO
intervention in South Vietnam, the 1964 Stanleyville airdrop carried out in cooperation by Belgium, the United States, and the United Kingdom, the intervention
by the Members of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia (1968), and the joint
Unilateral intervention
U S.-South Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia (1970).
is essentially characterized by the lack of formal authorization from any competent international body, universal or regional, and in the case of collective unilateral intervention, by the non-institutionalized character of the association of
Unilateral intervention must be distinStates carrying out the intervention.
guished on the one hand from intervention by armed forces under the direct
control of the United Nations (Korea, UNEF, ONUC, Cyprus) or of an appropriate regional organization (1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic,
in its second stage, after the "take-over" by the Organization of American
States), and on the other hand from individual or collective intervention duly
authorized by such an organization (first stage of the intervention in the Dominican Republic, carried out by the United States, but subsequently "ratified" by

the Organization of American States).
3. Humanitarian intervention has been defined as:
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With the exception of some vague and controversial allegations of self-defense by Indian spokesmen, 5 India itself has not

tried to justify its intervention in East Pakistan on international
legal grounds. Specifically, she has not appealed to the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention. 6 Nevertheless, the failure of the
Indian government to refer openly to this theory does not alter
the fact that its course of action in the Bangladesh situation probably constitutes the clearest case of forceful individual humanitarian intervention in this century. The question which the Indian
mhe

justifiable use of force for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another State from treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which the sovereign is presumed to
act with reason and justice.
E. STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 348 (1931). Compare Rougier, La Thiorie
de l'Intervention d'Humanitg, 17 REVUE GENERALE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIQ E (REV. GEN. DR. INT'L PUBL.) 468, 472 (1910) [hereinafter cited as
Rougier].
4. For the purposes of this article, the term intervention is defined as "dictatorial interference by a State [or group of States] in the affairs of another
State for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual conditions of things."
1 L OPPENHEiM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 305 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955) [hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM].
This emphasizes that "intervention proper is
always dictatorialinterference, not interference pure and simple." Id. This definition rejects as too broad Accioly's definition: "Intervengdo pode ser definida
corn a ingerancia de um Estado nos neg6cios internos ou externos de outro Estado nio dependents dale, com a intengilo de lhe impor certa maneira de proceder." H AccIOLY, MANUAL DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PUILiCo 50 (8th ed.
1968). As pointed out by M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HumA
Rirs
14-15 (1962) [hereinafter cited as GANiJ], and by Reisman, Hu-

manitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND

THE UNITED NATIONS

167, 179 n.42 (R. Lillich ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Reisman], the term dictatorial does not necessarily require the actual use or
threat of armed forces to allow an interference to be considered intervention, but
can be taken to include other modalities of coercion as well. Nevertheless, this
article will be primarily concerned with armed intervention.
5. See, e.g., Prime Minister Gandhi's statement in the Indian Parliament,
May 24, 1971, cited in Nanda, Self-Determination, supra note 1, at 334 & n.94;
Prime Minister Gandhi's statement in The Motherland (New Delhi), Dec. 5,
1971, at 2, col. 1., cited in Nanda, Critique,supra note 1, at 65 & n.95.
6. A possible explanation for India's reluctance to invoke formally the theory of humanitarian intervention in what appears to have been an almost perfect
setting to do so, may have been its desire to avoid inconsistency between its
course of action in the Bangladesh situation and its previous position in theoretical debates in the United Nations, where it apparently favored a strict interpretation of articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter, thereby rejecting any additional exceptions to the flat prohibition of the threat or use of force regardless of motive.
See, e.g., Statement by Mr. Krishna Rao (India), Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation
Among States (Spec. Comm. on Fr. Rel.), 19 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/A.C.
119/S.R.29, at 13 (1964).
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operation raises is whether the present state of international law,
as modified by the U.N. Charter, still permits unilateral resort
to force in order to remedy a situation of large-scale deprivation

of the most fundamental human rights, committed by a State
against its own nationals.
In view of the serious doubts recently expressed by various
scholars as to the existence of a "right" to intervene for human-

itarian purposes as a generally recognized principle of customary
international law (even in the pre-Charter period'), it will be

necessary to analyze this particular contention before assessing
the eventual survival of the doctrine in spite of the U.N. Charter
prohibition of State-initiated force.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION:

STATE PRACTICE

Despite such early precedents as the Crusades, several of
7. Lauterpacht stated that: "The doctrine of humanitarian intervention
has never become a fully acknowledged part of positive international law." Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
46 (1946). But see note 125 infra and accompanying text. Compare Waldock,
The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law
(Hague Academy of International Law), 81 RECUEIL DES Corms 455, 461
(1952) [hereinafter cited as Waldock], who fails to mention humanitarian intervention in his list of traditional grounds of justification for intervention. See
also J. BRImxY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 403 (6th ed. H. Waldock 1966) [hereinafter cited as BRIERLY]; GANJI, aupra note 4, at 42; R. REDSLOB, TRATE DE DROlr
DES GENS 258 (1950) [hereinafter cited as REDSLOB]; Franck & Rodley, After
Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM.
J.INT'L L. 275, 277 ff., 299 & 302 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Franck & Rodley];
Humphrey, Foreword, in 1-TNIUAMTTAR TN TI ErVENTON, supra note 4, at VTT;
Marshall, Comment, 3 INT'L LAWYER 435 ff. (1969).
Contra, D. BowETr,
SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (1958) [hereinafter cited as BowEar];
L. CAVARE, LE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POSITIF 632 (3d ed. 1969); 1 P.
GUGGENHEIM, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 289 (1953); A. THoMAs &
A. THOMAS, THE DoMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 1965, at 19-20 (IXth Hammarskjbld Forum 1967) [hereinafter cited as THoMAs & THOMAS]; Aronianu,
L'Intervention d'Humanit6 et la Dclaration Universelle des Droits de l'Homme,
33 REVUE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL, DE SCIENCE DIPLOMATIQUE ET POLITIQUE
126, 128 ff. (1955) [hereinafter cited as Aron~anu]; de Nova, The International
Protection of National Minorities and Human Rights, 11 HOWARD L. J. 274
(1965); Lillich, Forcible Self-Help to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV.
325, 326 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lillich, Self-Help]; Lillich, Intervention
to Protect Human Rights, 15 McGILL L. J. 205, 209 ff. (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Lillich, Intervention]; McDougal & Reisman, Response, 3 INT'L LAWYER
438 ff (1969); Rbling, On Aggression, on International Criminal Law, on International Criminal Jurisdiction (Part 1), 2 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR INTERNATIONAAL RECHT 167, 177 (1955) [hereinafter cited as R61ing].
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which could be considered humanitarian interventions, or the
16th and 17th century religious wars,8 it seems that the institution
of humanitarian intervention is in fact largely a creation of the
latter part of the 19th century. This is certainly true so far as
State practice explicitly referring to this justification is concerned.
Earlier instances of humanitarian intervention are too closely tied

with a feeling of religious solidarity to allow them to be classified
as genuinely humanitarian.
A large number of cases have occurred in which States in
the 19th and early 20th century allegedly intervened on behalf of
the local populations in other States. Examples include the
United States' interventions in Cuba at the end of the 19th century,' and the protests by the European Major Powers against the
cruel treatment of political prisoners in Morocco in the beginning of the 20th century. 10 These cases seem to lack either a clear
humanitarian motive or the highly coercive character of an armed
intervention." Therefore, the analysis of pre-Charter precedents of
8. For examples of interposition by sovereigns in favor of religious minorities in other States, see 1 R. PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL

LAW 621 et seq. (3d ed. 1879).
9. But see Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 4, at 182-83.
For the official U.S. justification for the first of this series of interventions, see
President Grant's Message to the U.S. Congress, Dec. 7, 1874, cited in W. MANNING, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 97, n.t (rev. ed. S. Amos 1875)
[hereinafter cited as MANNING].
See generally 6 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 ff. (1906) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]; de Lapradelle,
Chronique sur les Affaires de Cuba, 1 REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIQUE ET DE SCIENCE
POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L'ETRANGER 74 (1900) [hereinafter cited as de

Lapradelle]; Lefur, Chronique sur la Guerre Hispano-Amiricaine, 5 REV. GEN.
DR. INT'L PUrL. 665 (1898).

For a summary of the U.S. involvement in Latin

America from the Spanish-American War to the creation of the Organization of
American States, see H. DE VRIES & J. RODRIGUEZ-NOVAS,
AMERICAS 16-17 and 20 (1965).

THE LAW OF THE

10. See Rougier, Chronique des Faits Internationaux, 17 REV. GEN. DR.
INT'L PUBL. 62, 98 ff. (1910).

For a comprehensive treatment of 19th and

early 20th century instances of humanitarian "intervention," both armed and diplomatic, see E. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 63-316 (1921)
[hereinafter cited as STOWELL].

11. GANJI, supra note 4, at 41, n.124. Instances of peremptory demands
by Major Powers, as occurred quite frequently in that period, should not be summarily discarded as not amounting to intervention. Often backed by an implicit
threat of military or other measures, in case satisfaction was not given, they
could be almost as coercive as actual armed intervention and retain a particular relevance as precedents in view of the prohibition in the U.N. Charter of
not only the use but also the mere threat of force. See U.N. CHARTER, art.
2, para. 4. A good example of the threat to use force for humanitarian purposes
is provided by the peremptory demands of France and Great Britain, backed by
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forceful humanitarian intervention must be restricted to the notorious cases in Eastern Europe. 2
A.

Intervention in Greece (1827-1830)

As a result of the numerous massacres perpetrated in previous years by the Sublime Porte, France, Great Britain, and Russia concluded the Treaty of London on July 6, 1827. In this
treaty they resolved unilaterally to combine their efforts to put
an end to the bloodshed in Greece and proposed a limited local
autonomy for the region within the Ottoman Empire. Upon rejection of their proposal by the Turkish government, the three
Major Powers undertook an armed intervention which on September 14, 1829, resulted in the a posteriori acceptance by the
Porte of the provisions of the 1827 Treaty of London, and in
the independence of Greece in 1830.
In his InternationalProtection of Human Rights, Ganji contends that this intervention provides only a very limited precedent
of humanitarian intervention, insofar as the armed intervention
against Turkey was mainly carried out by Russia. It was his opinion that Russia could rely on certain concessions it obtained from
the Sultan by the 1774 Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji for the protection of the Christian religion in the Ottoman Empire."
It seems, however, that this approach is far too negative
in view of the rather revolutionary character of the course of action of the European Powers, since this was an era where the
absolute personal jurisdiction of the Prince over his subjects was
still largely regarded as a central attribute of sovereignty. It
appears clear that this course of action could
tauiily not have
been envisaged as early as 1774, nor assented to beforehand by
Turkey in the Treaty. It is indeed doubtful whether Russia could
justify its armed intervention on the Treaty, for article VII merely
provided that:
The Sublime Porte pledges to protect the Christian religion
and its churches constantly; and also it grants permission to
the Ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia to make representations in all circumstances, in favor of the new church
the mobilization of their fleets, to the King of the Two Sicilies in 1856. Rougier,
supra note 3, at 475.
12. The facts of these cases are taken primarily from GANJI, supra note
4, at 22 ff.; STOWELL, supra note 10, at 63 ff.; Rougier, supra note 3, at 473.
See also J. MATrIOTT, THE EASTERN QUESTION (2d ed. 1930).
13. GANJi, supra note 4, at 23-24.
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.as well as in favor of those who service

Furthermore, as far as participation in the intervention by
France and Great Britain is concerned, it is even clearer that
this provision could not provide a treaty-basis, since the Treaty
was a purely bilateral agreement between Turkey and Russia.
Finally, in the 1827 Treaty of London the Major Powers
themselves indicated that their action was dictated "no less by
sentiments of humanity, than by interest for the tranquilty of
Europe;"" thus invoking, for the first time in history, humanitarian concern as a justification for intervention.
B.

Intervention in Syria (1860-1861)

Following the massacre of thousands of Christians in Syria
'by the local Moslem population with the complicity of the Turkish
authorities, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia met with
Turkey at the Conference of Paris and signed a Protocol on August
3, 1860. In this agreement they gave France a mandate to intervene in Syria to restore order in the area. Six thousand French
troops were sent to Syria, and on October 5, 1860, an International
Commission was created. This commission adopted a set of rules
regulating the French presence in Syria and, on June 9, 1861, a
new Constitution for the Lebanon region. Subsequently, the
French force, having completed its mission, left Syria.
Apparently, not too much importance should be given to the
fact that formally this operation did not amount to an intervention
since the Sultan gave his consent to the activities of the Concert
of Europe by signing the Protocol of Paris. 1 6 One can reasonably
14. 1774 Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Turkey and Russia (Kutchuk-Kainardji), 2 G. DE MARTENS, RECUEIL DES TVAIrs 287-322 (2d ed. 1817),
cited in GANJI, supra note 4, at 18 (emphasis added). Articles XVII and XXIII
of the same treaty contain similar pledges. This persecution of Christians in
Turkey constituted a violation of these treaty commitments and, under the then
valid rule of legal resort to force for enforcement of treaty obligations, would

have justified Russian self-help in the form of intervention However, the inclusion in article VII of a specific permission for the Russian agents in Turkey to
make representations-and nothing more--could, e contrario,indicate that other,

more drastic measures by Russia in case of violation of these specific human rights
provisions had not been envisaged nor consented to in the treaty.
15. Treaty of London, July 6, 1827, 14 BRIT. & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS
633 (1826-1827), cited in GANJi, supra note 4, at 22.

16. "When consent is given by a state to foreign action of an interventionary character, in reality there is no intervention." THOMAS & THOMAS, supra
note 7, at 22. Although strongly opposed to any form of intervention for any
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question the validity of that consent, for it seems clear that Turkey assented to the French expedition "only through constraint
17
and a desire to avoid worse.

Similarly, one should not place too much emphasis on the
official ground of justification invoked by the Major Powers: article IX of the General Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, concluded between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia,
Sardinia, and Turkey. The first paragraph of this article merely
takes note of the promulgation by the Sultan, in February 1856,
of the Firman Hatti-Sherif. This document was a domestic legislative instrument of utter vagueness in which he affirmed his gen-

erous intentions towards all his subjects without distinction as to
religion or race. The second paragraph of the same article specifically provides that this reference to the Firman:
[C]ould not, in any circumstance, give the right to the said
Powers to intervene either collectively, or separately, in the
relations of his Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in
the internal administration of his Empire.' 8

As Rougier, a contemporary, observes: "Their right to intervene
cannot be based on this text, but only on the fact that the Turkish
government had allowed six thousand of its subjects to be massacred."' 9 And he concludes: "The Syrian intervention was thus
a humanitarian intervention, and not an intervention aimed at en-

forcing execution of a convention."20
reason whatsoever, Mencer reaches a similar conclusion based on a formalistic
logical reasoning:
[S]i l'admissibilit6 de l'intervention humanitaire est conditionn~e par un
assentiment donn6 pr~alablement et express6ment dans un trait6, . ..
d'une part . . * ilne s'agit pas d'une imposition de volont6 an vrai sens
c.cc temc d'un ingerence cntrcprise contre la voh'"t de V'1tat
respectif (puisqu'il ne s'agit point d'une intervention au sens des ragles
de droit), et d'autre part, il s'y applique la r~gle selon laquelle il est
possible . . .de donner, par ]a voie d'un trait6 valide et librement
conclu, l'assentiment a toute ing6rence et non seulement A lintervention
humanitaire.
Mencer, La Codxistence Pacifique et le Principe de la Non-Intervention, I BOLETIN
MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARAO 314 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Mencer].
17. STOWELL, supra note 10, at 66. Even those scholars who question the
existence of a customary international law right of humanitarian intervention feel
compelled to concede this point: 'The state practice justifies the conclusion that
no genuine case of humanitarian intervention has occurred, with the possible ex-

ception of the occupation of Syria in 1860 and 1861." I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AN THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 340 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
BROWNLIE]. See also GANJI, supra note 4, at 26 & 28.
18. 46 BRIT. & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 12 (1855-1856), cited in GANJI, sUpra
note 4, at 20.
19. Rougier, supra note 3, at 474.
20. Id., at 474 n.4. It would seem that this provision of the Treaty of
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Intervention in the Island of Crete (1866-1868)

As a result of several years of persecution and discrimination
at the hand of the Turkish authorities in the island, the Christian
population of Crete broke into open rebellion against the Ottoman rulers in 1866 and proclaimed enosis (union) with Greece.
Following the brutal repression of the revolt by the Porte, the
European Powers, with the exception of Great Britain, made various pressing demands upon the Sultan, ranging from Turkish
consent to an on-the-spot investigation by an International Commission of Inquiry to free elections and independence of Crete.
None of these proposals were accepted by the Porte, but upon
British advice, the Sultan promulgated a new Constitution for the
island, ameliorating the position of the Christians. The Sultan's
reaction thus avoided the armed intervention which had been envisaged by the European Powers following his initial refusal.
In this particular instance, it seems that the diplomatic interposition of the European Powers could, as Ganji contends, 2 ' be
based on the violation by Turkey of specific treaty obligations.
The Powers invoked in justification various provisions of the London Protocol of February 20, 1830, whereby France, Great Britain,
and Russia guaranteed the Greek independence, as well as article
IX of the 1856 Treaty of Paris. While the latter, as has already
been indicated, could not possibly provide a treaty basis for an intervention, albeit a purely diplomatic one, it seems that the tripartite
London Protocol could justify, on conventional grounds, the nonforceful intercessions of France and Russia. This is true since the
Protocol, as adhered to by Turkey in a note of April 24, 1830,22
Paris, if it has to have any relevance at all in this case, should be interpreted
as a pledge by the Great Powers to refrain from intervening, rather than as
allowing them to intervene. Contra: GAaNi, supra note 4, at 30-31, who makes
the rather controversial statement that the firman of the Sultan has to be considered an integral party of the treaty since several European Powers would have
"hesitated" to accept the treaty, had those guarantees for the non-Moslem pop-

ulation not been given by Turkey. And he concludes:
The principle of non-intervention in the second paragraph of article IX

was embodied for the sole purpose of providing that, as long as the
Sultan was acting in good faith in implementing the Firman, the European powers were to abstain from intervening ...
Id. (emphasis added).
21. GAiJI, supra note 4, at 29.

22. 17 BarT. & FOREIGN
supra note 4, at 28.

STATE

PAPERS 203 (1827-1830), cited in GANJx,
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contained a declaration by France, Great Britain, and Russia to
the extent that:
[E]ach Allied Power . . . would consider it its duty to
interpose its influence with the Porte, so as to ensure to the
Sainhabitants of the above mentioned Isles [Candie 23 and
24
mos], protection against oppressive and arbitrary acts.
Whether this document would have equally justified the
armed intervention once envisaged by the European Powers, is
much more doubtful. Furthermore, it leaves unaltered the finding that the Protocol could not provide a conventional ground
for the participation of those European Powers not parties to it
(Austria, Italy, and Prussia).
D.

Intervention in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria
(1876-1878)

Following a formal declaration of war by Serbia and Montenegro against the Porte on June 30, 1876, in support of the
oppressed Christian populations of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and
Bulgaria, the European Powers met with Turkey at the Conference of Constantinople. When the Sultan refused to agree to
the establishment of an International Commission to control the
implementation of the reforms he proposed to carry out in the
Balkan, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy,
and Russia met separately and agreed upon the London Protocol of
March 31, 1877. In this Protocol, the European Powers reaffirmed
their concern for the Christians in the area and indicated their intention to watch the fulfillment of the reform promises made by the
Porte in the 1856 Treaty of Paris. They also stressed their determination to take all necessary measures in the event that the Sultan
failed to improve the condition of his Christian subjects in the
Balkan.
After rejection of the Protocol by Turkey on the grounds
of domestic jurisdiction in general, and of the restrictive terms
of article IX, paragraph 2, of the 1856 Treaty of Paris in particular,2 5 Russia declared war upon the Porte. Subsequently, the
other Major Powers declared their neutrality and, on February
23. This is the ancient french name for Crete used in the treaty.
24. 17 BRIT. & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 203 (1827-1830), cited in
supra note 4, at 28.
25. See authority cited in note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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19, 1878, the war came to an end with the signing of the Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano.
Following negotiations between Austria-Hungary, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, and Turkey at the Congress of Berlin, the 1878 Treaty of Berlin was adopted. It provided for limited local autonomy of a Christian government under
Turkish suzerainty in Bulgaria, and for the occupation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. It further reaffirmed the
independence of Montenegro, Rumania, and Serbia, and imposed
specific obligations of religious and racial non-discrimination upon
Turkey, both in the Empire itself, and in the autonomous principality of Bulgaria.26
The declarations of war by Serbia and Montenegro were officially justified by humanitarian solidarity with the oppressed
populations in the neighboring countries. On the other hand,
the demands by the European Powers, as well as the war waged
by Russia, were once more formally based upon an invocation
of article IX of the 1856 Treaty of Paris. As has been indicated
earlier, this provision could not provide a valid ground for intervention, armed or non-armed. Again, it seems that this is a case
which could only be justified by the underlying humanitarian concern of the Major Powers, as was clearly alluded to in the note
of the Russian government to the Sublime Porte of November
13, 1876:
His Imperial Majesty does not want war . . . but is determined not to hestiate as long as the principles that have been
recognized as equitable, humane, necessary by the whole of
Europe. . . have not received full execution in effective
guarantees.

27

E. Intervention in Macedonia
(1903-1908, 1912-1913)
Following increasingly intense sporadic insurrections in Macdonia from 1893 onward, and more directly in response to the
atrocities committed by the Ottoman troops in mid-1903, AustriaHungary and Russia, acting as mandatories of the Concert of Europe, strongly urged the Porte to accept the Miirzsteg Program.
26. 69 BRIT. & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 753 (1877-1878),
supra note 4, at 20-21.

cited in

GANJI,

27. 47 BRIT. & FOREIGN STATE PAPERs 321 (1856-1857), cited in GANJI,
supra note 4, at 31 (emphasis added).
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This program included a series of far-reaching reform proposals for
Macedonia, the introduction of which was to be controlled by
Austrian and Russian diplomatic agents. Impressed by the European unity and determination, the Sultan, late in 1903, gave
his consent to the Program.
After the outbreak of the Young Turk Revolution in June,
1908, the Powers withdrew their control agents, as the reformist
ideology of the new rulers made it appear likely that application
of the Program would be continued and foreign supervision
seemed to have become unnecessary. This hope was soon shattered when the new regime embarked on a program of intense
"Turkification" of the Christian population of Macedonia. In
view of this unexpected development, and particularly of the extreme brutality with which the "Turkification" was carried out,
Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, "unable to tolerate any longer the
sufferings of their brethren in Turkey," 8 declared war upon the
latter. On May 30, 1913, after some seven months of fighting,
this war came to an end with the conclusion of the 1913 Treaty
of London, by which Turkey ceded the greater part of Macedonia for partition among the Balkan Allies.
In 1903, the peremptory demands by Austria-Hungary and
Russia on behalf of the Concert of Europe were, again, formally
based on the provisions of article IX of the 1856 Treaty of Paris,
and on various parts of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. As indicated
above, article IX lacks relevance. However, reference to the latter
treaty is more convincing. It is clear that articles 23 and 62 of
the 1878 treaty imposed specific obligations on Turkey regarding
the treatment of its non-Moslem subjects"9 and as a result the
right of intervention to secure compliance with conventional obligations was generally accepted under international law at that
30
time.
It is noteworthy, that the three Balkan Allies, although not
able to invoke any breaches of direct treaty commitments since
they were not parties to, but only subjects of, the Berlin Treaty,
did not hesitate to resort to force. Significantly, their justification for their course of action was their humanitarian concern with
the treatment inflicted upon the Macedonian people.8"
28. Note Verbale to the British Government, 106 BRIT. &

FOREIGN STATE

PAPERS 1059-60 (1913), cited in GANJI, supra note 4, at 36.

29. See authority cited in note 26 supra and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Rougier, supra note 3, at 474.
31. See authority cited in note 28 supra and accompanying text.
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THE PRE-CHARTER DOCTRINE

A. The Question of Principle: Is Humanitarian
Intervention Permissibleunder InternationalLaw?
While rather vague statements, to the extent that a sovereign
is entitled to intervene on the basis of religious solidarity in the
internal affairs of another when the latter mistreats his own subjects beyond the limits of what seems acceptable, can be found as
early as the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, it is only later 32 that
this doctrine appears to have been secularised in the doctrine of
lawful assistance to a people struggling against tyranny.
Albeit in general terms, Grotius accords his support to this
view when he declares:
There is also another question, whether a war for the subjects of another be just, for the purpose of defending them
from injuries by their ruler. Certainly it is undoubted that
ever since civil societies were formed, the ruler of each
claimed some especial right over his own subjects. . . .[But]
[i]f a tyrant . . . practices atrocities towards his subjects, which no just man can approve, the right of human
33
social connexion is not cut off in such case.
Vattel, on the other hand, seems not to have been completely able to resolve what Mosler called "the problem of the
friction between Sovereignty and the Law of Nations. 34 First,
he observes:
The sovereign is the one to whom the Nation has entrusted
the empire and the care of government; it has endowed him
with his rights; it alone is directly interested in the manner
in which the leader it has chosen for itself uses his power.
No foreign power, accordingly, is entitled to take notice of
the administration by that sovereign, to stand up in judgment
of his conduct and to force him to alter it in any way. If
he buries his subjects under taxes, if he treats them harshly,
it is the Nation's business; no one else is called upon to admonish him, to force him to apply wiser and more equitable
32. For an analysis of the writings of early scholars on this point, see Esmein, La Theorie de l'Intervention Internationale chez Quelques Publicistes FranVais du XVlme Sicle, 24 NOUVELLE REVUE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANCAIS
ET ETRANGER 563 (1900).
See generally A. DUNNING, POLITICAL THEORIES
FROM LUTHER TO MONTESQUIEU

(1905).

33. H. GROTus, 2 DE JuRE BELLI EST PACIS, Ch. XXV, at 438 (Whewell
transl. 1853).
34. H. MOSLER, DIE INTERVENTION IM VOLKERRECHT 3 (1938).
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principles.3 5
Vattel immediately qualifies this general statement by the apparently contradictory contention that:
[I]f the prince, attacking the fundamental laws, gives his
people a legitimate reason to resist him, if tyranny becomes
so unbearable as to cause the Nation to rise, any foreign
power is entitled to help an oppressed people that has requested its assistance.A
Once the middle of the 19th century is reached, the decline of
the Law of Nature and the rising of the contradictory values of
nationalism, sovereign independence and nonintervention on the
one hand, and humanitarianism on the other hand, influences the
thinking on the subject. The statements become clearer; the scholars take positions; and, in general, a dichotomy appears between
the champions of an expanding nonintervention norm and those
who favor a more flexible rule permitting intervention on various
grounds.
Kant, for instance, illustrates the first approach when he
states:
In general . . . the bad example given by a free person to

the others does not result in any damage to the latter. One
could thus not intervene for that motive alone without oneself giving an example of the very scandal one is trying to
37
avoid and without endangering the autonomy of all States.
Mamiani, the leader of the Italian nonintervention or neonationalist school, is quoted by Carnazza-Amari as saying:
The actions and the crimes of a people within the limits of
its territory do not infringe upon anyone else's rights and do
not give a basis for a legitimate intervention. Truely, what
positive right of the other peoples does one infringe upon?
Have you ever heard it said that the law requires that one
be only confronted with good example .... 38
Carnazza-Amari himself summarizes the extreme position of
the Italian school as follows:
Neither can one justify intervention in the case where the
35. 2 E. DE
ed. 1863).

VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS,

Ch. IV, para. 55 (Pradier-Fod6r6

36. Id., para. 56.

37. E.

KANT, EsSAI

PHILOSOPHIQUE SUR

LA PAIX PERPETUELLE,

art. V,

cited in Rougier, supra note 3, at 482 n.1.

38. 1 CARNAZZA-AMARI, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PAIX 557 (Montanari-Revest transl. 1880).
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local government does not respect the most elementary laws
of justice and humanity. 89
This rigid noninterventionism was not particular to Italy. In
France, for example, Pradier-Fod&6 states:
The right to punish presupposes sovereign power, on the part
of the one exercising it, over the one against whom it is
being exercised.

.

.

. While the sovereign can sanction

crimes that disturb the social and political order of the people
he governs, his authority expires at the border of the national
territory, and he lacks the right to punish criminals whose
acts would have affected public order abroad. Accordingly,
if he lacks this right as against criminals that would be mere
as to
individuals, a fortiori he cannot be so preposterous
40
exercise it as against a State and a whole people.
And he concludes:
This [humanitarian] intervention is illegal because it constitutes an infringement upon the independence of States, because the powers that are not directly, immediately affected
by these inhuman acts are not entitled to intervene. If the
inhuman acts are committed against nationals of the country
where they are committed, the powers are totally disinter-

ested. The acts of inhumanity, however condemnable they
may be, as long as they do not affect nor threaten the rights
of other States, do not provide the latter with a basis for
lawful intervention, as no State can stand up in judgment
of the conduct of others. As long as they do not infringe
upon the rights of the other powers or of their subjects, they
remain the sole business 41of the nationals of the countries

where they are committed.
Heffter, in Germany, seems to espouse the doctrine of the

Italian school when he writes:
As far as no imminently threatening violations of the law
39. Id., at 555 (emphasis added). See also E. OMBALI, IL NON-INTERvENTO-STuDIo Di DIRrro INTERNAZIONALE UNIVERSALE 262 (1889) and TANOVICEANO, LE DROrr INTERNATIONAL DE L'VINTERVENTION 12-13 (1884).

Strangely

enough, the Italian school, while absolutely condemining intervention for humanitarian purposes as such, strongly supported the right of States to assist other
nations struggling for independence. Id., at 89. This approach is similar to
the current double standard applied by the United Nations in dealing with human
rights questions involving self-determination of colonial peoples, as opposed to
human rights violations in a non-colonial setting.
40. 1 P. PRADIER-FODERE, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EtROPEEN ET
AmaicIA N 655 (1885).
41. Id. at 663. See also DE FLOEcKHER, DE L'INTERvENTION EN DRorr
INTERNATIONAL

18-19 (1896).
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or [actual] perils are involved, even the most outrageous inequities, that are committed in a State, cannot provide another [state] with a legal ground for unilateral intervention
against the former;
for no State is entitled to pass judgment
42
upon another.
The Latin American scholars, traditional champions of the
nonintervention principle in view of their experience as victims
of repeated foreign intervention, took the same inflexible approach. For instance, Pereira states:
Internal oppression, however odious and violent it may be,
does not affect, either directly or indirectly, external relations
and does not endanger the existence of other States. Accordingly, it cannot be used as a legal basis for use of force and
43
violent means.
Likewise in the Anglo-American literature, some resistance
against the notion of a permissible intervention for humanitarian
purposes can be found in this period. Halleck, for example,
writes:
We have stated . . . that when a state is desolated by pro-

tracted civil war, foreign interference, by way of pacific mediation, in order to stay the effusion of blood, is not only justifiable, but is sometimes a duty imposed by humanity. But
will the general interests of humanity justify interference to
44
the extent of war of intervention?
Quoting Phillimore, he answers this question negatively:
This ground of intervention.

. .

urged on behalf of the gen-

eral interests of humanity, has been frequently put forward,
42. A. HEFFTER, DAS EUROPXISCHE V6LKERRECHT DER GEGENWART AUF DER
BISHERIGEN GRUNDLAGEN 109-10 (7th ed. 1882) [hereinafter cited as HEFFER).
He approves, however, the Italian support for the right of assistance to peoples
involved in a war of independence:
Eine weitere Befugniss, nd.mlich zu einer thatlichen Cooperation eroffnet sich wenn in einem Staate ein innerer Krieg wirklich ausgebrochen
ist und ein anderer Staat von dem im Recht befindlichen aber widerrechtlich bedringten Theile um Hilfe angerufen wird. Es ist schon
das Recht jedes einzelnen Menschen, dem widerrechtlich Gekrhinkten zu
seiner und seines Rechtes Erhaltung beizustehen; es muss auch das
Recht der Staaten sein.
Id., at 110. Even more resolute in his condemnation of humanitarian intervention is Gareis: "Von der Anwendung des 'Prinzips der Nichtintervention' allgemein eine Ausnahme zu Gunsten der Humanitht zu machen ist unzuldissig. .. "
K. GAREIS, INSTITUTIONEN DES V6LKERRECHTS 96 (2d ed. 1901). See also H.
STRAUCH, ZUR INTERvENTIONSLEHRE 13-14 (1879).
43. 1 L. PmnIA, PRINCIPIOS DE DmErro INTrNAcioNAL 97-98 (1902),
cited in 1 H. AccIoLy, TRAITE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 283 (Goul6
transl. 1940) [hereinafter cited as AccIoLy].
44. H. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 340 (1861).
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and especially in our own times, but rarely, if ever, without
others of greater and more legitimate weight to support it.
. . .As an accessory to others, this ground may be defensible, but, as a substantive and solitary justification of intervention in the affairs of another country, it can scarcely be
admitted into the code of international law, since it is manifestly open to abuses, tending to the violation and destruction
45
of the vital principles of that system of jurisprudence.
More typically, however, a substantial body of writers
espouse a double-level permissibility by refusing to grant humanitarian motivation the character of a formal legal justification of
intervention, while at the same time recognizing that a violation
of the nonintervention principle, though technically a breach of
the law, might in certain circumstances be not only excusable,
but even commendable. Bernard, for instance, states: "The law
. . . prohibits intervention.

.

.

. Nay, there may even be cases

in which it becomes a positive duty to transgress it."' 4 6 Specifically referring to humanitarian considerations, Harcourt argues:
"Intervention is a question rather of policy than of law, and when
wisely and equitably handled . . . may be the higher policy of

justice and humanity."41
Another tendency in this period is to accept a limited right
of humanitarian intervention, restricting its lawful application
either to very specific circumstances or to situations involving
certain categories of States only.
An example of the former type of qualification is provided by
Creasy when, acknowledging that "intervention may be justifiable, and even a duty, in certain exceptional cases, 48 he restricts
the legality of humanitarian intervention to those cases only:
[W]here we intervene in behalf of a grievously oppressed
people, which has never amalgamated with its oppressors as
one nation, and which its oppressors have systematically
treated as an alien race, subject to the same imperial authority, but in other respects distinct . . . [or] where the

King, or dominant party of a nation keeps up, in defiance
45. 1 R. PHILLIMORE, ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, paras. 394 ff., cited in HALLECK, supra note 44, at 340.
46. M. BERNARD, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION 33-34 (1860).
47. V. HARCOURT (HISTORICUS), LETTERS ON SOME QUESTIONS OF INTERNA(emphasis added). Compare the modem approach to
TIONAL LAW 14 (1863)
retaliation of Falk and Bowett, note 194 infra. See also note 193 intra and
accompanying text.
48.

E. CREASY, FIRST PLATFORM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (1876).
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of the State's fundamental Laws, a mercenary army of regular troops, especially if carefully organized and officered by
men who are of creed, of politics, and of feelings alien from
those held by the great majority of the population, and
where, by this being done, all effective manifestations of the

popular will, and the formation of a truly national force are
,
rendered utterly impossible, ... 49
thus requiring a racial element to transgress the internal matter
aspect of the treatment by a sovereign of his own subjects."0
More common, however, was the notion that the right to
intervene for humanitarian motives was to be restricted to the
relations between "civilized" and "non-civilized" nations.
de Martens, for instance, argues that:
Vis-a-vis non civilized nations . . . intervention by the civilized powers is in principle legitimate, when the Christian
population of those countries is exposed to persecutions or
massacres. In those circumstances, it is justified by common religious interests and humanitarian considerations ...
These motives are not applicable to the relations between civilized powers ...

51

By so arguing, he links the notion of humanity with that of religious solidarity and with the existence of different categories of
States. Often without the religious connotation, similar opinions
can be found in the works of a number of jurists of this period.52
Although their pronouncements usually remain vague and
are often qualified by considerations of Major Power supremacy
and outspoken predilection for collective action, from the 1860's
on, writers seem increasingly won to the idea of the lawfulness
Following some rather revolutionary conceptions by Heiberg,5" revealed as early as 1842, and shortly after the publication
of Berner's Deutsche Staatswivrterbuch,5 4 Dana's edition of Whea49. Id., at 303-05.

50. Compare the current "double standard" generally applied by the United
Nations regarding human rights violations in accordance with the presence or
absence of a racial or colonial implication.
51. 1 F. DE MARTENS, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 398 (L6o transl.

1883).
52. See BERNARD, supra note 46, at 7; STRAucH, supra note 42, at 14;
GAREIS, supra note 42, at 85. For a critique of this approach, see KEBEDGY,
INTERVENTION 85-86, cited in STOWELL, supra note 10, at 65, n.14.
53.

HEIBERG,

DAS PRINZIP DER NICHTINTERVENTION

AUF DIE AUSSERE UND INNERE ORGANISATION DES STAATS

54

BERNER, DEUTSCHE, STAATSW6RTERBUCH
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ton's Elements of InternationalLaw notices in 1866 that:
The interference of the Christian powers of Europe, in
favor of the Greeks . . . affords a further illustration of the
principles of international law authorizing such an interference . . . where the general interests of humanity are infringed by the excesses of a barbarous and despotic govern55
ment.
Referring primarily to civil strife situations, Bluntschli observes in 1874:
One is authorized to intervene to ensure respect for the individual rights that have been recognized as necessary . . .
whenever they happen to be violated in the struggles between
citizens of a single state. 5 6
Qualifying his position by the restriction that "[i]nterference
on the score of humanity or of religion can be justified only by
the extreme gravity of the case," 57 Woolsey, in 1876, unambiguously asserts that:
[I]nterference . . . can be justified . . . on . . . the . . .
following [ground]: . . . [t]hat some extraordinary state
of things is brought about by the crime of a government
against its subjects. 58
That same year, in a letter addressed to Rolin-Jacquemyns,
Arntz developed the theory as follows:
When a government, even acting within the limits of its
rights of sovereignty, violates the rights of humanity, either
by measures contrary to the interests of other States, or by
excessive injustice or brutality which seriously injure our
morals and civilization, the right of intervention is legitimate.
For, however worthy of respect the rights of sovereignty and
independence of States may be, there is something even
more worthy of respect, namely the law of humanity, or of
human society, that must not be violated. In the same way
as within the State freedom of the individual is and must
be restricted by the law and the morals of the society, the
individual freedom of the States must be limited by the law
of human society.5"
55. H. WEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 113 (8th ed. R. Dana
1866).
56. J. BL'JNTSCHLI, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL CODE 272, art. 478 (Lardy
transl. 1874).
57. T. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 73
(1876).
58. Id., at 57.
59. Lettre de M. Arntz, in Rolin-Jacquemyns, Note sur la Thiorie du Droit

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol4/iss2/8

18

Fonteyne: The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Interven
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

And he concludes I recognize the right of intervention in an
absolute way as against all States."6
Some ten years later, Fiore, although basically a noninterventionist, 61 articulates the doctrine further:
It is, indeed, unquestionable that, as a society cannot be
imagined in the absence of laws, abidance by the natural
laws of the society of States is of such capital importance
for everybody's tranquilty that, if one of them was to be permitted to violate them with impunity, and the others were
obliged to remain indifferent to that violation, without the
right to prevent it, the society of States could not survive.
62

Specifically regarding humanitarian intervention he concludes:
The violation of international law can also be a consequence
of events occurring inside a State, and which results in the
direct violation of international law. Let us assume, for instance, that a prince, in order to put down a revolution,
violates all the generally recognized laws of war, has prisoners executed, authorises destruction, looting, arson, and
encourages his supporters to commit those odious actions and
others of the same kind; or, alternatively, let us suppose that
it is the faction that [seized power] which engages in similar crimes. Inaction and indifference of other States would
constitute an egocentric policy contrary to the rights of all;
for whoever violates international law to the disadvantage of
anybody, violates it not only to the detriment of63 the person
directly affected, but as against all civilized States.
The legal character, in the opinion of these writers, of the
permissibility of humanitarian intervention is clearly apparent
For instance, de Lapradelle, commenting upon the U.S. intervention in Cuba, states:
Whereas it is true that States are sovereign, that sovereignty
. . . has its limits.

. .

in international law.
64

.

.

in the fund-

amental rights of humanity.
Despite similar views expressed in that same period by other
d'lntervention, 8 REVUE

DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL ET DR LEGISLATION COMPARER
[REv. DR. INT'L & LEGISL. COMp.] 675 (1876).
60. Id.
61. Rougier, supra note 3, at 482 n.1.
62. 1 P. FIORE, NOUVEAU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 521-22 (Antoine
transl. 1885).

63. Id., at 524-25.
64. de Lapradelle, supra note 9, at 75 (emphasis added).
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scholars6 5 as well as statemen, 66 it is only after the turn of the
century that one is able to witness what Mandelstam called "the
victory of the principle of humanitarian intervention over the
rigid dogma of nonintervention." 6' 7 Of particular importance for
this development, together with the precedents set by State practice primarily in Eastern Europe, was the fundamental refusal of
many authors to allot to State sovereignty the character of an ab65. See, e.g., S. AMOS, POLITICAL AND LEGAL REMEDIES FOR WAR 158
(1880) [hereinafter cited as AMos]. "[Giross acts of inhumanity . . . persisted
in on either side . . may, on grounds of humanity, properly precipitate intervention." Accord: Engelhardt, Le Droit d'Intervention et la Turquie, 12 REV.
DR. INT'L & LEGISL. COMP. 365 (1880):
A un point de vue plus large et en dehors des ingrrences qu'autorisent
d'une part le droit conventionnel proprement dit et d'autre part le droit
international bas6 sur des maximes solennellement reconnues et communrment observ~es, l'intervention peut 8tre admise lorsqu'un Etat . . .
se rend coupable d'une 'violation 6norme' des droits de l'humanit6.
Presumably as a result of the self-determination aspect of most precedents, a
large number of scholars concentrate on situations involving civil strife when
illustrating their plea in support of humanitarian intervention. For instance,
Hall observes:
While however it is settled that as a general rule a state must be allowed to work out its internal changes in its own fashion . . . interven-

tion for the purpose of checking gross tyranny or of helping the efforts
of a people to free itself is very commonly regarded without disfavour.
W. HALL, A TREATISE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 265 (2d ed. 1884). See also
A. RIVIER, LEHRBUCH DES V6LKERRECHTS 233 (1899) [hereinafter cited as
RIVIER]:

Als ein fernerer Fall, wo Intervention rechtm~issig ist, wird auch derjenige angegeben, wo die Rechte der Menschheit von einer grausamen,
barbarischen Regierung verletzt werden durch flagrante Ungesetzlichkeiten, Verfolgungen u.s.w., wo gewiss noch hinzuzufiigen ist der Fall
ihnlicher Gewiltthatigkeiten von seiten einer revolutionfren Faktion,
welchen Namen sie auch tragen m6ge.
Compare MANNING, supra note 9, at 97:

The only grounds on which interference with the affairs of a foreign
State would now be held capable of justification are . . . (2)

the con-

tinuance of a revolutionary state of affairs in the foreign State under
circumstances in which it seems highly probable that, without such interference, either public order can never be restored at all; or can only
be restored after such sufferings to humanity and such injuries to surrounding States as obviously overbalance the general evil of all interference from without.
66. See, e.g., Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Fish cited in D. GRUBER,
CRISIS DIPLOMACY 339 (1959):
mhe general rule of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other
countries does not apply if 'the grievance adverted to is so enormous,
as to impart to it, as it were, a cosmopolitan character, in the redress
of which all countries, governments and creeds alike are interested.'
See also Statement of President McKinley (1898), cited in Reisman, supra note
4, at 182-83 and President Grant's Message to Congress cited in MANNING, supra
note 9.
67. Mandelstam, La Protection des Minorits (Hague Academy of International Law), 1 RECUEIL DES COURs 367, 391 (1923) [hereinafter cited as
Mandelstam].
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solute principle not susceptible of restrictions or exceptions.

Consequently, nonintervention was seen as a flexible notion
which could lawfully be disregarded for the defense of higher

values in certain circumstances. 68
In the period immediately preceding the first World War,
it seems that the majority of the writers had been won to the

idea of the legality of humanitarian intervention,69 and that only
a few scholars, albeit notorious ones, continued to reject the validity of the doctrine. Apparently, most of them did so on the
basis of doubts as to the actual integration of the theory in the
generally accepted body of customary international law, rather
than because of fundamental philosophical, ideological, or political convictions regarding absolute sovereignty and noninterven70
tion.
A minority appeared still troubled by the contradiction between these basic notions and their personal humanitarian feelings. Lawrence, for instance, tried to reconcile both by emphasizing the difference between law and policy, giving priority to
the latter in exceptional circumstances:
68. See notes 94-96 infra and accompanying text. See generally Brocher
de la F16ch~re, Solidaritget Souveraineti, 26 REV. DR. INT'L & LEGISL. CoMP. 415

(1894).
69. For example, Basdevant urged that: "[L]'Etat qui ne remplit pas sa
fonction de justice m8me l'6gard de ses nationaux perd son droit au respect et
. . . les autres puissances sont autoris~es A substituer leur action
la sienne."
Basdevant, Chronique, 11 REV. GEN. DR. INT'L PUBL. 110 (1904). In an often
quoted passage, Borchard notes that:
[Wihere a state under exceptional circumstances disregards certain
rights of its own citizens, over whom presumably it has absolute sovereignty, the other states of the f.mily of nations are authorized by
internationallaw to intervene on grounds of humanity.
E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 14 (1916)
(emphasis added). See also L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 347 (Ist ed.
1905); A. PILLET, PRINCtPES DE DRoIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 171 (1903); Lingelbach, Intervention in Europe, 16

ANNALS AM.

ACAD'Y POL. & SOC'L

Sci. 25

(1900); Rougier, supra note 3; MOORE, supra note 9, at 347 ff.
70. The following statment by Hodges typifies this position: "As regards
an intervention undertaken in the cause of humanity there seems to be a divergence of opinion among the most prominent writers . . ." H. HODGES, THE DocTRINE OF INTERVENTION 87 (1915) [hereinafter cited as HODGES].
With a view
towards the evolution of international law, he optimistically concludes:
As the feeling of general interest in humanity increases, and with it
a world-wide desire for something approaching justice and an international solidarity, interventions undertaken in the interests of humanity
will also doubtless increase. .

.

. We may therefore conclude that fu-

ture public opinion and finally international law will sanction an ever
increasing number of causes for intervention for the sake of humanity.
Id. at 91.
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There is a great difference between declaring a national act
to be legal, and therefore part of -the order under which
states have consented to live, and allowing it to be morally
blameless as an exception to ordinary rules.

.

.

. An inter-

vention to put a stop to barbarous and abominable cruelty
is "a high act of policy above and beyond the domain of
law." It is destitute of technical legality, but it may be
71
morally right and even praiseworthy to a high degree.
Hyde attempted to partially circumvent the domestic jurisdiction problem by a requirement of transnational racial connection between the intervenor and the victims:
In the treatment of its own citizens a state enjoys the largest
freedom. Its conduct in that respect may be cruel and may
visibly shock the sensibilities of -the outside world. Nevertheless, the law of nations does not, by reason thereof, stamp
it as illegal and of a character to justify interference . ..
It is conceivable, however, that the tyrannical conduct of a
state towards its own subjects might directly affect a numerous class of subjects of another state, who were connected by blood with the victims of ill-treatment. If the injury thus sustained were of periodic recurrence and felt by
large numbers of the population of the outside state, the
latter would doubtless assert the right to intervene. In so
doing it would find justification for its action on grounds
72
closely analogous to -those of self-defense.
In the period separating the first World War from the creation of the U.N. Charter, the same dichotomy runs through the
doctrine, with scholars such as Fauchille, 73 Stowell,'7 Mandelstarn, 75 Seferiades, 76 Le Fur,77 and Mosler 78 asserting that the
71. T.

LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

129 (4th ed.

1910). Compare authorities in notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
72. Hyde, Intervention in Theory and Practice, 6 ILL. L. REv. 1, 6 (191112). Compare notes 204 ff. infra and accompanying text See also the Indian
justification for intervening in East Pakistan, in Nanda, Self-Determination, supra
note 1 at 334 & n.94 and Nanda, Critique, supra note 1, at 65 & n.95.
73. See 1 P. FAUCHILLE, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 570 (8th
ed. 1922).
74. See STOWELL, supra note 10, at 52.
75. See Mandelstam, supra note 67. See also A. MANDELSTAM, LA SOCIETE
DES NATIONS ET LES PuIssSANCEs DEVANT LE PROBLEME ARMENIEN 1-32 & 307
ff. (1926).
76. See Siffriadin, Principes Gingraux du Droit International de la Paix
(Hague Academy of International Law), 34 RECUEIL DES CouRs 381, 389
(1930).
77. See LEuR, L'INTERVENTION POUR CAUSE D'UMfuAr
(1935), cited in
Aron~anu, supra note 7, at 129,
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theory of humanitarian intervention has been assimilated by cus-

79
tomary international law, while others such as Roxburgh, Hig-

gins, 0 Winfield,"' Potter, s" Strupp,83 Trolliet, s4 and Accioly8 5 ex78. See Mosler, supra note 34, at 63.
79. Roxburgh approximates Hodges' position (note 70 supra) in his statement that:
But whether there is really a rule of the Law of Nations which admits
such interventions may well be doubted. Yet, on the other hand, it
cannot be denied that public opinion and the attitude of the Powers
are in favour of such interventions, and it may perhaps be said that
in time the Law of Nations will recognize the rule that interventions
in the interest of humanity are admissible.
1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 229 (3d ed. R. Roxburgh 1920) [hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM].
80. Higgins adopts the Lawrence approach (note 71 supra and accompanying text), at least for unilateral humanitarian intervention in this statement that:
Interventions, whether armed or diplomatic, undertaken either for the
reason or upon the pretexts of cruelty, or oppression, or the horrors
of a civil war, or whatever the reason put forward . . . would have
• . . to justify themselves, when not authorized by the whole body of
civilized states accustomed to act together for common purposes, as
measures which, being confessedly illegal in themselves, could only be
excused in rare and extreme cases in consideration of the unquestionable extraordinary character of the facts causing them, and of the evident purity of the motives and conduct of the intervening state.
W. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 344 (8th ed. P. Higgins 1924)
[hereinafter cited as HALL].
81. Winfield classifies humanity among the "alleged grounds of justification [of intervention] as to which international practice is uncertain." Winfield,
The Grounds of Intervention in International Law, 5 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 149,
He concludes: "But whether it is legal . . . must in the present
161 (1924).
state of practice be regarded as an unsolved point." Id., at 162.
82. Potter follows Oppenheim's 3d ed. (see note 79 supra) and Winfield
(see note 81 supra), in their doubts as to the integration in customary international law of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, primarily due to insufficient State practice:
dans la pratique internationale, ce droit ait jamais
I1 ne semble pas que,
fatl Jet - Lnep reconnats-ne indiscultable, Les cas ovh Pn'on Wen est
pr~valu sont trop peu nombreux, les divergences dans les theses gouvernementales trop marques-l'Etat qui subit l'intervention nie toujours
l'existence de ce droit-et la question dans son ensemble encore trop
d~battue, pour qu'on puisse affirmer que le droit dont il s'agit s'est
6tabli d'une mani~re positive.
Potter, L'Intervention en Droit International Moderne (Hague Academy of International Law), 32 RECUELL DES COURS 611, 653 (1930).
83. Strupp unambiguously rejects any lawful humanitarian intervention:
[Partout oh le droit des gens, valable entre l'Etat intervenant et celui
contre lequel l'intervention est dirig~e, n'accorde pas un droit spcial,
l'intervention est illicite. Elle l'est aussi 1 oti il y a intervention collective . . . de m~me que lM oi l'humanitO exige imp~rieusement ce que
l'on a d~nomme 'intervention d'humanit& Le droit des gens ne connait
ni celle-ci, ni d'autres.
Strupp, Les Rdgles Ggngrales du Droit de la Paix (Hague Academy of International Law), 47 RECUEIL DES COURs 263, 517 (1934).
84. See TROLLIET, ESSAI suR L'INTERVENTION EN DROrr INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 66-70 & 78 (1940).
85. See ACCiOLY, supra note 43, at 282-83.
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pressed doubts as to whether this incorporation had actually taken
place.
Nevertheless in 1946, shortly after the United Nations had
become a reality, Sir Hartley Shawcross felt entitled to declare
at the Niiremberg Trials that:
[T]he right of humanitarian intervention, in the name of the
Rights of Man trampled upon by the State in a manner offensive to the feeling of Humanity, has been recognized long
ago as an integral part of the Law of Nations.86
B. The Question of Norms: When is Humanitarian
Intervention Permissible?
Caught up in the theoretical debate on the preliminary
principle question of whether international law recognized a
right of humanitarian intervention in general, the 19th and preCharter 20th century scholars devoted little attention to the study
of the conditions under which such interventions, if at all permissible, could lawfully take place. The majority focused on the
philosophical or politico-ideological foundations of their basic
position and generally failed to supplement their initial choice
with a comprehensive set of norms for decision-making or appraisal of actual cases.
Some loosely articulated criteria-examples of which include
a widely shared preference for collective forms of action,8 7 insis86. H.

SHAWCROSS, EXPOSE INTRODUCTIF AU PROCES DE NUREMBERG, cited

in Aron~anu, supra note 7, at 127 (emphasis added).

87. Amos indicated that:
It is in the highest degree desirable that the element of private interest
should be entirely removed,-an object which can best be secured, in
respect of such cases as these, by habits of combined policy among as
great a number of States as possible.
AMos, supra note 65, at 159. Accord RIVIER, supra note 65, at 233:
Dies [ndmlich Intervention zu Gunsten der Humanitdt] ist aber kein
Fall berechtiger Intervention eines einzelnen Staates. Vielmehr laisst sich
in solchen Fallen nur eine Kollektivintervention der Staaten, welche die
V61kergemeinde bilden, rechtfertigen.
Compare, FIORE, supra note 62, at 522-23:
Ce qu'il importe de bien 6tablir, c'est que, comme le motif l~gitime
suppos6 d'intervention d6riverait du devoir qui incombe h l'association des
Etats d'observer et de faire respecter le droit international, un Etat ne
pourrait pas 6tre seul juge, et justifier ensuite l'intervention en all6guant
qu'il existait une atteinte r~elle au droit des gens. La soci&t6 des Etats
devrait seule avoir ce droit, et l'on doit consid6rer par consequent comme
une chose bien certaine, que l'unique garantie solide et exempte de
danger serait la garantie collective des Etats qui vivent en soci6t6 de fait.
Toutefois, rien ne s'opposerait h ce que, lorsque les Etats associns
auraient reconnu dans certains faits le caract~re d'attentats au droit des
gens, et employs d'abord tous les moyens pour rtablir l'ordre, l'un ou
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tence on disinterestedness of the intervenor, 8 or restriction of
the scope of applicability of the doctrine to certain situations

only--civilized versus non-civilized nations,

9

assistance to justi-

fied rebellion against tyranny, 90 extreme atrocities, 9 1 deprivation
of certain specified, more fundamental human rights 9 -- have
been proferred. However, no integrated list of criteria of legality
l'autre d'entre eux ne put 6tre drl~gu6 pour excuter le mandat de punir
l'offense dans les limites prralablement 6tablies sauf ensuite le droit
pour les Etats associ~s de r~gulariser les conditions de fait qui pourraient
rrsulter de l'intervention.
But see 1 P. FIORE, NOUVEAU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 225 (PradierFod6r6 transl. 1868). See also HALL, supra note 80, at 344; HODGES, supra note
70, at 91; OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, at 229; Arntz, supra note 59, at 675; Winfield, supra note 81, at 162. Contra, Stowell, supra note 10, at 63, n.l: "[C]ollective intervention is often too unwieldy and too tardy to serve as a practical
method of procedure."
88. Amos stated that "so far as [humanitarian] intervention is concerned,
it is, above all, desirable that the purity of the motives should be conspicuous. . . ." AMOS, supra note 65, at 159. See also HALL, supra note 80, at
344; MANNING, supra note 9, at 96 & 97. Contra, STOWELL, supra note 10,
at 63, n.l:
Desirable as it may be that humanitarian intervention should be, whenever possible, both disinterested and collective, this cannot be made a
condition for the justification of the action taken. .

.

.

States are not

generally willing to incur the burdens of intervention, even on the appealing ground of humanity, unless they are also actuated by other and
more selfish considerations ....
89. See note 52 supra and accompanying text. See also J. BLUNTSCHLI,
LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL CODIFIE, arts. 5 & 280 (1870), cited in Rougier, supra
note 3, at 505 and J. LORIMER, PINCIPES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 69 (Nys
transl. 1885).
90. See discussion in note 39 supra. See also CREASY, supra note 48, at
303 & 305; HEFFTER, supra note 42, at 109-10; MANNING, supra note 9, at 97;
VATTEL, supra note 35, at 23.
91. Stowell urged that:
Pour que 'intervention d'humanit6 ne ser.e pas de pretexte %une immixtion dans les affaires int6rieures d'Etats voisins, la pratique internationale l'interdit pour le motif g~nral de conduite inhumaine, sauf
dans les cas ot le traitement inhumain des particuliers, sujets des Etats
voisins, r~sulte d'abus rrprtrs ou continus, constituant une d~nrgation
de certains droits reconnus aux particuliers dans toute communaut6
civilis~e.
Stowell, La Thdorie et la Pratique de l'Intervention (Hague Academy of International Law), 40 RECUEIL DES COURS 91, 141 (1932). See also HALL, supra
note 80, at 344; HERSHEY, ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW AND
ORGANIZATION 239 (1927); MANNING, supra note 9, at 97; WOOLSEY, supra note
57, at 57 & 73.
92. Fauchille wrote that:
Quels actes peuvent justifier une intervention d'humanitV? Ce sont les
actes attentatoires aux droits de l'homme, c'est-a-dire aux droits qui lui

appartiennent en tant qu'homme, avant m~me qu'il fasse partie d'une

soi&t6 politique. Or, ces droits se r6sument en deux id6es essentielles:
droit A la vie et droit A la libert6.
FAUCHILLE, supra note 73, at 570. Compare LEFU, supra note 77, cited in
Aron6anu, supra note 7, at 128-29.
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was presented until the publication of Rougier's La Thgorie de
l'Intervention d'Humanitg.93
After an extensive critique of the traditional notions of abso-

lute sovereignty and equality of States, particularly in connection
with the resulting doctrine of nonintervention,

4

Rougier sets out

what he calls "the theory of the law of humanity and of functional

power." 95 Proceeding within the framework of this basic postulate,9 6 he analyzes and rejects the legality of individual intervention9 7 and eventually opts for collective intervention on various
policy 9 8 and legal grounds. 99 Pointing out, however, that "in fact,
the scholars only require collegiality so as to ensure, among the
intervenors, the combination of two conditions: namely disinterestedness and the widest possible authority,"' 10 he concludes that
it is "the disinterestedness and the authority of the intervening
States, and not their number, which provide legitimacy to the intervention."''
Observing that, while these two basic require93. Rougier, supra note 3, at 497-525. For an outline and a short analysis
of Rougier's criteria, see GANJI, supra note 4, at 9-11.
94. Rougier, supra note 3, at 480-89.
95. Id., at 489-97. For a theoretical exposition, see Pillet, Le Droit International Public, 1 REV. GEN. DR. ITN'L PUBL. 1 (1894); Pillet, Les Droits Fond-

amentaux des Etats, 5 REV. GEN.

DR. INT'L PUrL.

66 & 236 (1898) and 6 REv.

503 (1899).
96. Rougier summarizes:
Cette theorie affirme l'existence d'une r6gle de droit generale s'imposant
aux gouvernants comme aux gouvemr6s, supbrieure au droit national et
international qui n'en sont que des expressions particulibres. Elle place
sous la protection de cette rfgle les prerogatives essentielles de l'individu,
ce qu'on appelle les droits de l'homme. Elle considere le pouvoir des
gouvernants comme la contre-partie d'une fonction qu'ils ont h remplir,
et conclut que le gouvernement qui manque h ses fonctions, partiellement
dechu de son pouvoir, poet subir le contr6le d'un Etat 6tranger.
Rougier, supra note 3, at 489.
97. Id., at 498-99.
98. Rougier enumerates the practical advantages of collective action as
greater material and moral power, avoidance of conflict between intervenors acting
independently without coordination, and increased impartiality due to the probable
presence within the intervening collectivity of non-directly interested States. He
argues that the inherent slowness of collective action could conveniently be
remedied by delegation of the interventionary power to a single State. Id., at
499-501.
99. Rougier summarizes his legal analysis as follows:
Le droit d'agir contre une gouvernement inhumain appartient proprement h la Societ6 des nations, gardienne du droit humain, que les
actes tyranniques lsent dans ses prerogatives essentielles; les puissances
intervenantes sont ses representants. Or la Socie6t des nations ne peut
6tre representee que par une coll6gialit6 d'Etats.
Id. at 501.
100. Id., at 502.
101. Id.
GEN. DR. INT'L PUBL.
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ments are generally fulfilled in the case of collective action, and that
this is not necessarily controlling,10 2 Rougier formulates his own
theory: "the system of disinterested and authorized interven03
tion.'
Acknowledging the de facto inequality of States, even within
the same "civilization," and refusing to ascribe to the traditional
principle of equality the character of a fundamental right of
every State, he claims that: "the law can only acknowledge the
natural hierarchy of power, moral authority or civilization that occurs between nations,"'1 4 and that "protection of the collective
interests requires the existence of rulers and ruled."'' 0
Considering the actual distribution of power in the world, he concludes
that certain States-the United States in the Americas, as recognized by the Monroe doctrine, and the "concert des grandes puissances" in Europe, as ascertained by almost a century of State
practice' 0 -"take control of the direction of general affairs and
possess over the others . . . a legitimate authority."'0 7 Insofar
as their actions appear to be disinterested in that they tend to
"ensure respect for the general rule of law and not to pursue
the realization of an individual advantage,"'0 8 this special authority, he submits, will allow them, individually in the case of
the United States and collectively in the case of the European
Major Powers, to intervene lawfully in their capacity of trustees
and defenders of the law of humanity whenever the latter is seriously violated in another State.
Turning finally to substantive requirements of legality, Rougier lists the following three criteria:
1. that the event which
nmotivates [intervention] be
an aotion of the public authorities, and not merely of
private individuals;
2. that this action constitute a violation of the law of humanity, and not merely a violation of national positive law;
3. that the intervention fulfill certain [circumstantial] requirements.' 09
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id., at 504.
Id.
Id., at 507.
Id., at 506-07.
Id., at 502.
Id., at 512.
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Regarding the first110 of these criteria, he specifies:
The fault [of the] government can consist either of a positive
action, or of an abstention. In the former case, the tyrannical measures are carried out or ordered by the very agencies of the State, with whom sovereign power rests, or by
agents of the public service. . . . In the latter case, the
abuses are committed by private individuals, but they are
tolerated by the government whereas it had the duty and
the capabilityof preventing them.1 1'
Regarding the second condition," l2 he makes a distinction
between the droits de l'homme---"which he possesses in his capacity as man even before his membership of a political society,
and which he would continue to possess if he ceased to be a
member [of such a society] . . ."I" and the droits du citoyen--"which the individual possesses as a result of his membership of a political society . . . "I"
Only the former could, if
violated, provide a sufficient ground for intervention" 5 since
[h]uman solidarity . . . requires protection of the human
physical, moral and social personality, but does not demand
that an individual be allowed to exercise, in his particular
society, certain given activities or benefit from certain social
advantages; determination of these advantages is within the
purview of the rules of nationalsolidarity."16
Analyzing what rights, specifically, are to be considered droits
de 'homme as opposed to droits du citoyen, and, as such, are
in principle susceptible of lawful protection by foreign intervention, he concludes that only the right to life," 7 the right to free110. See generally id., at 512-15.
111. Id., at 513 (emphasis added).

Compare, discussion, note 248 infra.

112. See generally Rougier, supra note 3, at 512-23.
113. L. DUGUIT, MANUEL DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONEL 483 (1907), cited in

Rougier, supra note 3, at 516.
114. Id.
115. Rougier noted that: "Seule la violation de ces droits essentiels serait
une juste cause d'intervention." Rougier, supra note 3, at 517.
116. Id., at 516 (emphasis added).
117. Regarding this right, Rougier states: "Tout homme a droit au respect
de sa vie, de son int~grit6 physique et
]a libre disposition de son individu."
Id., at 517. He furthermore considers the obligations of the State in this respect
to be active as well as passive: "Il ne suffit m6me point que les gouvernements
respectent ]a vie de l'individu; ils la doivent encore prot~ger." Id. He concludes:
Cette protection est une des fonctions primordiales qui s'imposent t
toutes les soci~t~s politiques et dont le mauvais accomplissement peut
justifier une intervention 6trang~re. L'application de cette idle la plus
universellement admise en doctrine vise le cas oih le Souverain fait massacrer ou laisse massacrer ses sujets.
id. Comparenotes 237 ff. infra and aciompanying text.
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dom 18 and the right to legality'" can be included in the first
category.
Finally, regarding his third criterion, 120 he acknowledges that
considerations of opportunity should, and in practice usually will,
play an important role in the decision of a State with respect

to whether to intervene. As factors particularly relevant for this
process, he mentions "the extent of the scandal,"' 121 "a pressing appeal from the victims, ' 122 "the very constitution of the guilty
state,' 1 23 and "certain favorable conditions relating to the political
118. As to the substance of this right, Rougier observes: "La qualit6 d'6tre
humain suppose la libert6 physique et morale ....
".Rougier, supra note 3,
at 518. As to the latter, he specifies:
La libert6 morale, A la difference de la libert6 physique, ne peut jamais
6tre enlev6e h l'individu. . . . Le gouvernement le plus tyrannique peut
seulement interdire les manifestations ext6rieures de cette libert6 ...
De telles mesures peuvent 6tre contraires aux droits du citoyen, notamment au droit d'6galit6, mais on ne saurait y voir des atteintes au droit
humain, aussi longtemps du moins qu'elles ne s'accompagnent pas de
persecutions violentes et d'attentats contre la vie et la libert6 des individus.
Id., at 519.
119. Rougier defines this right as:
[Lie droit pour tout individu d'Etre prot6g6 dans son activit6 par un certain ordre 16gal, d'6chapper au pur arbitraire de ses gouvemants, et de
n'&re frapp6 dans sa vie et dans ses biens que conform6ment A la loi,
par une autorit6 juridictionelle r6guli~re suivant des formes 6tablies.
Id., at 521. He justifies the inclusion of this right among the droits humains
by asserting that:
[L]'homme es un 6tre social ne pouvant vivre isol6ment et . . . 'existence d'une soci6t6 quelconque suppose 'establissment d'un ordre
l6gal . . . . Le droit humain veut que tout regroupement d'hommes
soit r6gi par une r~gle de droit.
Id. But he immediately qualifies this statement by adding:
Quant au choix et h la d~termination de cette r~gle, c'est l'affaire de
chaque socid6t particuli~re. . . . Si donc l'individu a un droit th6orique
A la lealit. l'6tablissement de cette 16galit6 est une question d'ordre
national. La droit de chaque homme se confond ici avec le droit du
citoyen.
Id.
He nevertheless argues that intervention for the protection of that right
could lawfully take place "ou bien lorsque les institutions l6gales d'un Etat
apparaissent inhumaines, ou bien lorsqu'un Etat viole les formes l6gales qu'il a
6dict6 [sic] lui-m~me...." Id., at 522. But he concludes, particularly in view of
of the principle of opportunity: "[I]l semble que . . . le droit a la lgalit6 doive
rester un droit purement th6orique...." Id., at 523.
120. See generally id., at 523-25.
121. Id., at 524. Rougier explains this requirement by specifying that intervention should be resorted to only:
[D]ans des cas exceptionellement graves, soit que ]a vie d'une population enti~re se trouve menac6e, soit que les actes barbares se r6p~tent
habituellement, soit que leur caract~re horrible choque plus violemment
]a conscience universelle.
Id. Compare notes 239 ff. infra and accompanying text.
122. Rougier, supra note 3, at 524.
123. Id. Rougier articulates this point by adding that States should refrain

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1974

29

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1974], Art. 8
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 4

balance, the economic rivalries, the financial interests . . . [of
the] intervenors . . .
I.

CONCLUSION AS TO THE CUSTOMARY LAW

Regarding the incorporation of the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention as an established principle in customary international
law, it has been demonstrated in the preceding analysis that,
while historically there has never been unanimity on this point,
there has, nevertheless, been some consistency since the latter part
of the 19th century. As Lauterpacht points out there has been:
a substantial body of opinion and practice in support of the
view that there are limits to [the] discretion [of states in
the treatment of their own nationals] and that when a State
renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecutions of
its nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental huintervenman rights ,and to shock the conscience of mankind,1 25
tion in the interest of humanity is legally permissible.
Furthermore, it seems that a correct interpretation of the
pre-Charter precedents corroborates neither Ganji's 12 6 nor Potter's conclusions. 2 7 Doubts may indeed be cast as to the sincerity
of the humanitarian motivation of some of these cases. Examples
of these include the unilateral large-scale military operations carried out by Russia against the Porte in 1877-1878 and the Macedonian war of 1912-1913. In spite of the formal treaty rights
of a clearly questionable nature usually invoked by the intervening States, it seems irrefutable that their major underlying concern
and true justification was the condition of the non-Moslem populations in the Ottoman Empire.
It is conceded that the precedents are not particularly numfrom intervening
[D]'autant plus que [l'Etat coupable] poss~de une organisation politique
plus parfaite garantissant plus efficacement les libert6s des citoyens contre
l'arbitraire gouvernemental. Aussi bien, dans un Etat semblable, les
violations d'humanit6 seront rares et exceptionelles, lies h quelque convulsion politique profonde, et disparaitront d'elles-m~mes sans qu'il
soit besoin d'une action internationale; celle-ci aurait plus de chances
d'aggraver le mal que de le gu6rir.
Id. Compare authority cited in note 244 infra.
124. Rougier, supra note 3, at 525.
125. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, at 312. See also H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 120 ff. (1950) [hereinafter cited as LAUTERPACHT].

126. "mhe practice of humanitarian intervention is limited to cases based
on conventions." GANJI, supra note 4, at 43.
127. See discussion in note 82 supra.
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erous, but the extent of State practice necessary to create a rule
of customary international law is a debatable question. That they
are actually so scarce should not come as a surprise. As Lauterpacht explains:
The disinclination to take the responsibility for an international conflagration likely to follow upon such intervention
or the consideration of the interests of the persecuted likely
to suffer rather than to benefit from intervention unless fully
for
backed by force, have been to some extent responsible
128
the relative infrequency of humanitarian intervention.
In addition, customary international law is not created by
State practice only. The opinions of the leading scholars, especially in an essentially non-institutionalized structure such as that
of international law, have a significant impact upon the development of the legal norms of the system, as was reaffirmed in article
38 ( 1 ) (d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.' 29
The continuous reference throughout the twentieth century
to the theory of humanitarian intervention, in the doctrine and
in State practice (as in the case of the 1964 Stanleyville airdrop 13 0 and in that of the initial stage of the intervention in the
Dominican Republic in 1965'13), and supplemented by its de facto
128. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, at 313. Regarding the motives for the lack
of real interest on the part of both foreign governments and public opinion for
human rights violations abroad, see Bilder, Rethinking International Human
Rights: Some Basic Questions, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 171.
129. The Statute provides that:
The Court, whose function it is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: . . .
subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachirs5

Of 'he

;tno,

qua!"."ici

pac..i.-

of%J. tilt.

s

ncat:

s,

a

a

suuaiu-

iary means for the determination of the rules of law.
I.C.J STAT., art. 38, para. l(d) (emphasis added).
130. See, e.g., Statement by President Johnson, reprinted in 51 U.S. DEP'T
See generally De Schutter, Humanitarian IntervenSTATE BULL. 846 (1964).
tion: A United Nations Task, 3 CALIF. W. INTOL L. J. 21-22 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as De Schutter]; Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 338 ff.; The Congo
Crisis 1964: A Case Study in Humanitarian Intervention, 12 VA. J. INTL L. 261
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Congo Crisis].
131. See, e.g., Statement by President Johnson, reprinted in 53 U.S. DEP'T
See generally ThoMAS & THoMAs, supra note 7; Bogen,
STATE BULL. 20 (1965).
The Law of Humanitarian Intervention: United States Policy in Cuba (1898) and
in the Dominican Republic, 7 HARv. INT'L L. J. 296 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Bogen]; Bohan, The Dominican Case: Unilateral Intervention, 60 AM. J. INT'L L.
809 (1966); Fenwick, International Law, the O.A.S. and the Dominican Crisis,
19 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 18 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Fenwick, International Law]; Fenwick, The Dominican Republic: Intervention or Collective
Self-Defense?, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 64 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Fenwick,
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utilization in the Bangladesh crisis seem indeed to undercut
the Thomases' contention that:
[Since u]nder the theory that to protest to a government
would be to intervene in the internal political systems which
recognize terror as a legitimate method of government, the
democracies failed (prior to the advent of World War II)
to protest the Nazi persecutions in Germany, the Franco persecutions in Spain and the Russian persecutions in Russia
and satellite countries . . ., humanitarian intervention in the
132
20th century. . . retains but little vigor.
The cases referred to constitute flagrant examples of failure to
invoke the doctrine in situations where it was genuinely demanded. 13 3 That this provides sufficient ground for the conclusion that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has fallen
in disuse and consequently lost any relevance or validity in present times, is a much more questionable contention. It does not
seem that international law requires constant, faultless utilization
to avoid automatic abolition of a customary rule; many rarely used
institutions of customary international law would otherwise have
to be considered invalidated for lack of sufficiently frequent application. For example, it is doubtful whether hot pursuit has
been used that often in recent times, and yet this right is unquestionably still accepted as a valid part of the general law of nations
as attested by its restatement in article 23 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas.
Turning finally to the normative problem, it appears that
some widely accepted criteria of legality of humanitarian intervention can be distillated from the abundant literature on the subject. This can be done in spite of the overall vagueness and
lack of structuration of the pronouncements by pre-Charter scholars:
Dominican Republic]; McLaren, The Dominican Crisis: An Inter-American
Dilemma, 4 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 178 (1966); Meeker, The Dominican Situation
in the Perspective of International Law, 53 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL. 60 (1965);
Nanda, The United States Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on
World Order (Part 1), 43 DENVER L. J. 441 (1966).

132. A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION 373-74 (1965). Compare, BROWNLIE, Supra note 17, at 340-41:
With the embarassing exception provided by Germany ['s invocation of
the doctrine in defense of its intervention in Czechoslovakia], the institution has disappeared from modern state practice.
133. But see Reisman, supra note 4, at 178, referring to "[Tihe Allied effort

against the Axis in the Second World War" as an extreme example of "inclusive
participation" in humanitarian intervention.
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(1) disinterestedness of the intervening Power(s), in the
sense of a non-seeking of particular interests or individual advan13 4
tages;
(2) restriction of the applicability of the theory to extreme
5
cases of atrocity and breakdown of order;11
(3) active participation or passive complicity or condonation
of the violations by the sovereign; 3 6
(4) general predilection for collective action,' 3 7 by preference at the hands of the Major Powers, 13 8 who have a particular
responsibility 3 9 for ensuring overall respect of minimal international standards of treatment of local populations.
As the foregoing study has shown, while divergences certainly existed as to the circumstances in which resort could be
had to the institution of humanitarian intervention, as well as to
the manner in which such operations were to be conducted, the
principle itself was widely, if not unanimously, accepted as an
integral part of customary international law. Indeed, "the doc134. Compare authorities in notes 249 ff. infra and accompanying text.
135. Compare authorities in notes 236 ff. infra and accompanying text.
136. Compare discussion in note 248 infra.
137. Compare authorities in notes 278 ff. infra and accompanying text.
138. As the Great Powers were then the only form of international "organization," this criterion is related to present day notions of primary responsibility of international organizations and the subsidiary character of humanitarian
intervention. See authorities in notes 267 ff. infra and accompanying text.
139. This aspect is emphasized by Rougier who urges formal recognition by
international law of this factual inequality. See text accompanying notes 94 &
104 supra. This position is not astonishing. This author concurs with Perez-Vera
in her statement that "aujourd'hui le principe de l'6galit6 souveraine de tous les
Etats, maigr-5ses dfaillances, 'cppose hun raiso-e'ment de. ce zenre ,.
Perez-Vera, La Protection d'Humaniti en Droit International, [1969] REVUE
BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

401, 416 [hereinafter cited as Perez-Vera].

He

would like to point out, however, that even today the principle of sovereign equality
of States seems far from absolute in practice. The U.N. Charter declares that
one of the purposes of the Organization is "to develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights . . . of peoples.....
U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 2 (emphasis added). The Charter also declares
that "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of
all its Members." Id., art. 2, para. 1 (emphasis added). The Charter nevertheless technically acknowledges the de facto inequality of its Member States by
granting a veto power to the Permanent Members of the Security Council, thus
recognizing that certain States are endowed with particular rights and responsibilities. Id., art. 27, para. 3. Further reference can be made to the problem of
micro-States in general, and in particular, to recent proposals which have been
made in the Organization of American States to restrict or prevent membership of
a potentially large number of small Caribbean island-States on the brink of independence.
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trine of humanitarian intervention appears to have been so clearly
established under customary international law that only its limits
and not its existence is subject to debate."' 140
IV.

PRESENT VALIDITY OF THE CUSTOMARY DOCTRINE

As many scholars have come to recognize in recent years,'
there is a need in the area of human rights to shift the field
of study from the substantive to the procedural side; in other
words, from defining human rights standards to creating machinery for their implementation and enforcement.' 42 As article
4 of the Proclamation of Teheran of May 13, 1968, noticed:
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights the United Nations has made substantial progress in
defining standards for the enjoyment and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . but much
remains to be done in regard to the implementation of those
rights and freedoms.

143

The numerous international human rights instruments which
have been adopted by the U.N. General Assembly during the last
two decades on the one hand, and the lack of any significant
number of ratifications of most major conventions by the nations
of the world'44 on the other hand, seem to justify this conclusion
and illustrate the problem of bridging the gap between mere
theoretical lip-service dictated by political opportunism, and practical application of the acclaimed principles. The fact that the
140. INT'L L. ASS'N, The International Protection of Human Rights by Gen-

eral International Law, Interim Report of the Sub-Committee, International Committee on Human Rights 11 (The Hague 1970).
141. The International Law Association concluded that:
[T]he trend is now towards the establishment of international machinery and techniques for implementation . . . that is to say . . . some
kind of supervision and control of the conduct of States in the observance of the standards now established.
INT'L L. ASS'N, Interim Report of the Committee on Human Rights, Report of
the 52d Conference 754 (Helsinki 1966).
142. "The most difficult problem still confronting the framers of the United
Nations' Human Rights Program is that of devising effective procedures for enforcement." McDougal & Bebr, Human Rights in the United Nations, 58 AM.
J. INT'L L. 603, 629 (1964).
143. International Conference on Human Rights, Final Act, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 32/41, art. 4 (1968).
144. As of November 1971, for instance, only thirteen ratifications had been
deposited for the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and four for the Optional Protocol on
Civil and Political Rights. D. HARRIs, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW 531 n.40; 539 n.53; and 540 n.57 (1973).
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U.N. Human Rights Commission has finally taken the important
step of deciding, in its rules of procedure, to take into consideration individual petitions concerning human rights violations, 1 45
is but meager consolation. It is in those extreme cases where
the most fundamental human rights are massively threatened, that
the United Nations and the regional organizations, paralyzed by
Major Power disagreements and the reluctance of the New States
to accept any infringement upon the sacrosanct principles of sovereign independence and nonintervention 146 in a setting lacking

colonial or para-colonial1 47 aspects, 148 have been unable or unwilling to take any significant measures.' 49 Biafra, Indonesia, Sudan, Burundi, Bangladesh, and, more recently, Uganda are but the
most recent and bloody examples of the unfortunate passivity
and ineffectiveness of the international organizations.'

In view of this state of affairs, one might have good reason
to question the wisdom'

of the now "classic" interpretation of

145. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, Commission on Human Rights, Res. I (XXIV), U.N. Doe E/CN.4/
SUB.2 CRP.6, art. 2(a) (1971).
146. For statements by national representatives in the United Nations, see
Fonteyne, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights: Recent Views
from the United Nations, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNrrED
NATIONS 197, at 205-06 & n.39; 209-11 & nn.53-58; 215-16 & nn. 74-76 (R. Lillich
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Fonteyne].
147. The term "para-colonial" is used here to indicate the situation in Rhodesia or South Africa where black-white racism is a remnant of a colonial past,
as opposed to "colonial" which indicates an overseas government situation, or "racial" which indicates a situation of racism lacking colonial origin.
148. For statements by national representatives in the United Nations, see
Fonteyne, supra note 146, at 208 n.50.
149. "mhe United Nations has not so far proved an effective instrument
for remedying flagrant violations of elementary rights and freedoms." BRIEELY,
supra note 7, at 295-96. See also Komarnicki, L'Intervention en Droit International Moderne, 60 REV. GEN. DR. INT'L PUBL. 521, 566 (1956), observing after
only a decade of U.N. activity, that:
[D]ans les conditions actuelles, les Nations Unies ne sont pas capables de
s'acquitter de leur tdche principale: contribuer au d6veloppement du
droit international et A 1'tablissement de l'ordre international basde sur
la justice, conform~ment aux buts et aux devoirs inscrits dans la Charte.
Compare, Remarks by Louis Henkin, in Biafra, Bengal, and Beyond: International Responsibility and Genocidal Conflict, 66 PROCEEDINGS AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. 89, 96-97 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Remarks by Louis Henkin]:
[I]t is not possible in civil wars to isolate and act only upon genocide
and other human rights violations. Indeed, usually the international
community can not act at all, because of the national and international
politics that dominate each civil war situation.
150. See, e.g., INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 1.
151. Lillich advocated that:
Surely to require a state to sit back and watch the slaughter of innocent people in order to avoid violating blanket prohibitions against the

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1974

35

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1974], Art. 8
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 4

the Charter regulation of use of force as illustrated for instance
by Mr. Gomez Robledo (Mexico) in the U.N. 6th Committee:
[U]nder article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter it was clear that the use of force was permissible in only
two cases: enforcement action ordered by the Security
Council under article 42; and in conformity with article 51
individual or collective self-defence in the event of armed
attack.

1 52

A departure from this strict constructionism of the Charter
provisions relating to the use of force, and from the traditional
domestic jurisdiction limitation, raises serious problems of Charter
interpretation. To quote Professor Lillich:
whether
[T]wo provisions make it "very doubtful"
forcible self-help to protect human rights is still permissible
under international law. In the first place, all states by
Article 2(4) renounce "the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,"
subject of course to the self-defense provision contained in
Article 51. Secondly, Article 2(7) prevents intervention by
the United Nations "in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state," except for the application
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 153
A.

The Domestic JurisdictionLimitation and the
Principleof Nonintervention'5 4

The principle of nonintervention, rather surprisingly in view
of its wide acceptance" 5 at the time of the creation of the United
Nations, is not explicitly provided for in the Charter regarding
use of force is to stress blackletter at the expense of far more fundamental values.
Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 344. Compare, J. STONE, AGGREssioN AND
WORLD ORDER 99 (1968) [hereinafter cited as STONE].
152. Mr. Gomez Robledo (Mexico), 18 U.N GAOR, 6th Comm., U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/S.R.806, at 133, para. 12 (1963). For further statements in the United
Nations, see Fonteyne, supra note 146, at 209-11 & nn.53-58.
153. Lillich, Intervention, supra note 7, at 210-11.
154. See generally Ermacora, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction
(Hague Academy of International Law), 124 RECUEIL DES CouRs 375 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Ermacora]; and Fawcett, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction, in ThE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 286 (E. Luard ed.

1967).
155. See, e.g., BRIERLY, supra note 7, at 402: "[Clertain principles were
fairly clear in customary law. Intervention, being a violation of another state's
independence, was recognized to be in principle contrary to international law.
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inter-State relations. 156 While article 2(4) specifically prohibits
the threat or use of force between States,' article 2(7) explicitly
covers the relations between the United Nations and its Members
only.' 58 This precludes the Organizationfrom intervening in mat-

ters essentially within the jurisdiction of any State with the important exception of actions in respect to threats to the peace, breaches
of the peace, and acts of aggression. 5 ' However, this does not
affect inter-State relations.
Notwithstanding some sporadic affirmations to the con-

trary, 10 it seems that the explicit references in articles 1(2) and
2(1) of the Charter'

and the subsequent interpretation given

to the nonintervention principle by a nearly unanimous doctrine
and by the United Nations itself, justify the contention that the

basic obligation of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of a
State is equally,1 2 if not more,' 63 applicable on the level of interState relations.
156. Despite wide recognition as an integral part of customary international
law, the principle of nonintervention was affected by vagueness and confusion.
Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 330 & n.31. As Brierly observed: "The law
of intervention .. .was also sometimes obscured under the cloak of a political
doctrine such as the Monroe doctrine...." See BRIERLY, supra note 7, at 402.
This, perhaps, provides a partial explanation for the indicated omission.
157. With the exception of article 51 situations, action in pursuance of a
Chapter VII decision, and the now obviously irrelevant Article 107.
158. For statements by national representatives in the United Nations, see
Fonteyne, supra note 146, at 204 & n.31.
159. U.N. CHARTER, Ch. VII.
160. See, e.g., Mr. Schwebel (U.S.A.):
[I]n the United States' delegation's view article 2(7) of the Charter
applied only to intervention by the United Nations, and . . . interven-

tion by one State in the affairs of another was illicit under the Charter
only when it was accompanied by the threat or use of force. Articie
2(7) was the only provision in the Charter which made express reference to non-intervention, and the scope of State intervention was defined only in Article 2(4).
19 U.N. GAOR, Spec. Comm. on Fr. Rel., U.N. Doe. A/A.C.119/S.R.32, at
25 (1964). For further statements in the United Nations, see Fonteyne, supra
note 146, at 204-05 & n.33.
161. But see discussion and authorities at note 139 supra.
162. See, e.g., Mr. Colombo (Argentina):
The Charter of the United Nations prohibited the Organization from
intervening in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. The same principle must be laid down in explicit
terms in regard to relations between the States themselves.
19 U.N. GAOR, Spec. Comm. on Fr. Rel., U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/S.R.28, at
7 (1964). For further statements in the United Nations, see Fonteyne, supra
note 146, at 205 & n.37.
163. The Representative from Cyprus stated that: "A very clear distinction
should . .. be drawn between the concept of absolute sovereignty of States in
relation to each other and that of the limited sovereignty of States in relation
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Today the whole range of activities relating to human rights,
both in and outside the United Nations, as exemplified by the
large number of declarations and conventions 6 which have in
recent years been adopted on the subject,1 65 indicate that the
scope of domestic jurisdiction is dwindling. Further examples
include the almost daily involvement of various U.N. agencies
and organs with actual human rights problems; 6 the repeated

refusal by the General Assembly and the Security Council to accept article 2(7) of the Charter as preventing consideration by
the United Nations of serious cases of human rights violations,' 6 7

particularly in a colonial or para-colonial context; 6 8 and, the
to the United Nations." Mr. Rossides (Cyprus), 18 U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm.,
U.N. Doe. A/C.6/S.R.822, at 230, para. 9 (1963).
Consequently, the nonintervention principle, as applicable to States, "had a much wider scope." Mr.
El-Erian (United Arab Republic), U.N. Doc. A/C.6/S.R.811, at 164, para. 26
(1963). For further statements in the United Nations, see Fonteyne, supra note
146, at 205 & nn.35-36.
164. See generally BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (I. Brownlie ed.

1971).
165. A large number of those conventions have failed to obtain a sufficient
number of ratifications to come into force. This does not basically alter the
conclusion that the whole area of human rights is presently the subject of, at
least theoretical permanent international attention.
166. See generally J. CAREy, U.N. PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLIrICAL
RIGHTS (1970) [hereinafter cited as CAREY]; Ermacora, supra note 154; Higgins,
Compliance with United Nations Decisions on Peace and Security and Human
Rights Questions, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS 34 (S.
Schwebel ed. 1971).
167. Consideration of such cases was addressed by the Representative from
Cyprus:
Since the adoption of the Charter, the general tendency had been . . .
to extend the possibilities of intervention by the United Nations. Thus
article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter had repeatedly been interpreted
by the General Assembly as allowing the United Nations to intervene
in the internal affairs of a State in case of a flagrant violation of human rights or of the provisions of the Charter.
Mr. Rossides (Cyprus), 18 U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., U.N. Do. A/C.6/S.R.822,
at 230, para. 10 (1963).
Compare the lack of action by the United Nations
in, for instance, the cases of human rights violations in Bulgaria, Hungary, Ru-

mania, Tibet, Greece, and Haiti. See generally M. RAJAN, UNITED NATIONS AND
341 ff. (1958) [hereinafter cited as RAJAN]; Ermacora,

DOMESTIC JURISDICTION

supra note 154, at 415 ff. For statements by national representatives in the
United Nations, see Fonteyne, supra note 146, at 206-09 & nn.40-49 & 5152.
168. See, e.g., Mr. Nachabe (Syria):
[A] state should not, under cover of the principle of non-intervention
in domestic matters, commit acts contrary to the peremptory rules of
international law, such as those which outlawed the discredited practices
of colonial domination and attacks on human rights.
20 U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/S.R.884, at 265, para. 52
(1965). For further statements in the United Nations, see Fonteyne, supra note
146, at 207-08, nn. 46-48 & 50.
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world-wide concern of the public opinion with extreme cases such
as Biafra, Southern Africa, Rhodesia or Bangladesh. 1 9 These
developments seem to substantiate Professor Ermacora's conclusion
that:
[T]he right to self-determination and the protection of human rights in matters of discrimination as far as "gross violations" or "consistent patterns of violations" are concerned
are no longer essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
States.... 170
Domestic jurisdiction is "an essentially relative question; it
In
depends upon the development of international relations.''
view of the variable character of the concept,172 it appears that
the universal attention devoted to the way in which people are
treated in their own country, and the practice of the United Nations in this field, must clearly be interpreted as indicating that
human rights have finally been removed from -the exclusive jurisdiction of States and lifted up into the realm of international
concern.17 3 As a consequence, human rights have been placed
outside the reach of the article 2(7) intervention ban, even in
cases not amounting to a threat to the peace.' 74 This is true so
169. See generally P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 91 (1949) [hereJEsSUP]; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 125, at 177 ff.; OPPENHEIM,
supra note 4, at 313; THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 132, at 376; Lillich, SelfHelp, supra note 7, at 338; McDougal & Bebr, supra note 142, at 612. Compare
the treatment of this question in connection with the U.N. mandatory economic
sanctions against Rhodesia in McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United
Nations: The Lawfulness of InternationalConcern, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 14 nn.
(1969) [hereinafter cited as McDougal & Reisman]. See also Howell, A Matter of International Concern, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 771 (1969). Contra, Acheson,
The Arrogance of InternationalLawyers, 2 INT'L LAWYER 591 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Acheson]. Compare, REDSLOB, supra note 7, at 250.
170. Ermacora, supra note 154, at 436. For allegations to the contrary
made on several occasions by South Africa in the United Nations, see CAREY,
supra note 166, at 104 ff.
171. Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees Case, [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No.
4, reprinted in 1 M. HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 143 (1943).
172. RAJAN, supra note 167, at 57 ff. Compare M. MOsKowrrz, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND WORLD ORDER 32 ff. (1958).
173. See Reisman, supra note 4, at 171 ff. Compare, The Question of Race
Conflict in South Africa, Consideration by the General Assembly Between the
7th and 14th Sessions, 1952-1959, in SUMMARY OF THE PRACTICE OF THE UNITED

inafter cited as

NATIONS AND OF VIEWS Ex'REssmn IN THE UNITED NATIONS BY MEMBER STATES
IN RESPECT OF FOUR OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING

FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT, 19 U.N.

GAOR, Spec. Comm. on Fr. Rel., U.N. Doe. A/A.C.119/L.2, at 141, para. 288
(1964) [hereinafter cited as SUMMARY]. Contra, id., at 141-42, para. 289.
174. See Reisman, supra note 4, at 189 & 190-91. Compare The Question
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far as measures by the United Nations are concerned, and prob15
ably regarding unilateral State action as well.'
B.

The Prohibitionof the Threat of Use of Force

As already indicated, what appears now to have become the
"classic" view of the Charter prohibition of the threat or use
of force in inter-State relations interprets article 2(4)176 in a
broad way intended to encompass the entire range of possible
1 77
situations.
Relying primarily upon the intentions of the framers, the
proponents of this approach stress the fact that the qualifying
terms "against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any State" ought not to be taken as restricting the absolute
scope of the prohibition. Acknowledging that an "unqualified"
interpretation of article 2(4) in fact constitutes a twist of the plain
meaning of the text, Professor Giraud notices that:
This [restrictive] interpretation has not been retained. The
of Race Conflict in South Africa, Consideration by the General Assembly Between the 15th and 17th Sessions, 1960-1962, in SUMMARY, supra note 173, at
146, para 298; The Question of Race Conflict in South Africa, Consideration by
the Security Council in 1963 and by the General Assembly During the 18th
Session, 1963, in SUMMARY, supra note 173, at 149, para. 301.
175. See generally R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 118-30 (1963). Compare, Wright, Domestic Jurisdiction as a Limit on National and Supra-National
Action, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 11 (1961). The conclusion which the present article
reaches at this point does not mean that armed unilateral intervention for humanitarian purposes is permissible under the U.N. Charter, for there still remains
the hurdle of the article 2(4) prohibition of use of force. This author contends
only, at this stage, that, unless the position is taken that the nonintervention principle is stricter for States and should be distinguished from the article 2(7) limitation on U.N. jurisdiction, the preceding analysis justifies acceptance of less extreme forms of coercive unilateral action in situations of gross and persistent violation of the most fundamental human rights. This conclusion stands as long as one
sticks to the "classic" interpretation of the term "force" in article 2(4), namely
armed force, an approach suggested, among other things, by the Charter itself
where it expressly lists, among the purposes of the Organization, the intention "[t]o
ensure . . . that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.
."
U.N. CHARTER, Preamble (emphasis added).
Compare BRIERLY, supra
note 7, at 415-16, concluding that "it is clear that article 2(4) does not preclude a state from taking unilaterally economc or other [measures] not involving
the use of armed force." Arriving at a similar conclusion on the nonintervention
point, but unwilling to go any further, the Thomases state:
The general international law right of an individual nation or a group
of nations to intervene for humanitarian purposes remains unchanged,
except that this intervention may no longer be taken by means involving the use or threat of force.
THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 132, at 384.
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reason for it is that this interpretation does not correspond

at all to the intentions of the drafters of the Charter. At
the San Francisco Conference, that portion of the sentence
referring to "the territorial integrity or the political independence" was added to the text merely to satisfy the small
Powers who wished to see the guarantee of article 10 of the
Pact of the League of Nations restated in the Charter, and
not to restrict the scope of the prohibition of recourse to
78
force.1
Similarly, regarding the final part of paragraph 4, Professor Wehberg points out:
The terms of the prohibition "in any other manner incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations," should not
be interpreted as implying any other authorized use of force.
. . . One can . . .refer [in this connection] to the state-

ments of the American representative [at] the debates [of
Committee I/1 of the San Francisco Conference], emphasizing that . . . the sentence "or in any other manner" was

intended to guarantee "that there would be no loopholes
")179

Looking at the article 2(4) prohibition within the framework
of the Charter as a whole, Sir Humphrey Waldock concludes:
[A]rticle 2(4) prohibits entirely any threat or use of force
between independent States except in individual or collective
self-defense under article 51 or in execution of collective
measures under the Charter for maintaining or restoring
peace. 1 0
This interpretation, which can properly be considered the genviews the
erally accepted one in the United Nations itself,'
Charter as a closed structure of self-sufficient norms, completely
176. The Charter provides that:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
177. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
178. Giraud, L'Interdiction du Recours d la Force-La Thgorie et la Pratique des Nations Unies, 67 REv. GEN. DR. INT'L PUBL. 501, 512-13 (1963).
See also Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defence, 37 BuT. Y.B. INT'L L.
183, 235 (1961).
179. Wehberg, L'Interdiction du Recours 4 la Force (Hague Academy of International Law), 78 RECUEIL DES CouRs 7, 70 (1951).
180. Waldock, supra note 7, at 493.
181. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
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divorced from the pre-existing body of rules under customary international law. This would ensure as a system of conflict-management in which articles 2(4) and 51 are inversely correlative and
182
intended to cover the whole spectrum of possibilities.
When supported by the contention that "if nations had
wished to exclude humanitarian intervention from these prohibitions . . . they would have done so explicitly," 183 this approach
leads necessarily to the general conclusion that
The landing of armed forces of one state in another state
is a "breach of the peace" or "threat to the peace" even
though under traditional international law it is a lawful act.
It is a measure of forcible self-help, legalized by international
law because there has been no international organization
competent to act in an emergency. The organizational defect has now been at least partially remedied through the
adoption of the Charter and a modernized law of nations
should insist that the collective measures envisaged by art.
1 of the Charter shall supplant the individual measures approved by traditional international law.

....

184

182. Compare, Rbling, supra note 7, at 177, who supports humanitarian intervention as an additional exception, not explicitly provided for in the Charter,
on the basis that "a legal rule without exceptions does not exist." He further
comments that: "It is impossible to formulate rules of law in such a way that
the most extreme and rare situations would be dealt with. An endeavour to
achieve such a rule would amount to perfectionism." Id.
183. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 7, at 22, referring to the Latin-American doctrine. Mencer noted that:
L'institution de la soi-disant intervention humanitaire ne constitue, dans
le droit international contemporain, aucune institution autonome, telle
pour laquelle la donnent certains auteurs dans une certaine mesure. Elle
ne constitue pas une exception de l'applicabilit6 g6n6rale et absolu [sic]
de l'interdiction d'intervention.
L'article 2, alinea 4, de la Charte
interdit aux Etats la menace ou l'emploi de la force, et ilse congoit que
l'intervention pour des raisons humanitaires n'est pas cit6e en tant
qu'exception de cette interdiction g6n6rale. Elle ne figure pas non plus,
en qualit6 d'exception,
l'article 2, alin6a 7.
Mencer, supra note 16, at 314-15. This contention raises the fundamental question as to whether the Charter must be construed as abolishing all pre-existing
norms of customary international law which it does not specifically and explicitly save, or has left unaffected those traditional rules which are not necessarily
in contradiction with its own provisions and purposes. This author tends to favor the latter position for a variety of reasons, including the widely shared principle of interpretation in domestic law, which could be applied here by analogy,
in that the technique of implicit repeal of pre-existing laws must be restrictively
interpreted, and applied only when contradiction with the new rules is unavoidable. Compare, Nanda, supra note 131, at 478. See also Report of the 6th
Committee, 18 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Vol. III, Agenda Item 71, U.N. Doc.

A/5671, at 34, para. 61 (1963); Samuels, in

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND

THE UNITED NATIONS 43 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).

184. JESSUP, supra note 169, at 169-70.
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Applying this approach specifically to humanitarian intervention, Dr. Brownlie logically concludes:
[I]t is extremely doubtful if this form of intervention has
survived the express condemnations of intervention which
have occurred in recent timest' 5 ] or the general prohibition
of resort to force to be found in the U.N. Charter. 186
Faced with the problem of the de facto inability and political unwillingness both of the United Nations' 87 and of the regional organizations, 18 to take any significant action, other than
185. It seems, however, that there has never been a clear and unambiguous
condemnation by the United Nations of a specific instance of humanitarian intervention as such. In connection with the 1964 Stanleyville airdrop, for example,
Nanda concludes: "[T]he Council Resolution after the Stanleyville debate
[does] not prohibit such action, nor . . .specifically permit it." Nanda, supra
note 131, at 477-78. Similarly, Bastid sums up her evaluation of the same Security Council debates as follows:
Sous reserve du probl~me difficile de l'apprciation des conditions dans
un cas concret ilsemble bien qu'au cours de ce d6bat le princpe m~me
de l'intervention d'humanit6 n'ait pas 6t6 contest6. De ce point de vue
la position des repr6sentants des Etats d'Am6rique latine, traditionellement attaches au principe de non-intervention doit 8tre sp6c;alement
relev6e. Le Df1sgu6 du Br6sil a d6clar6 que ]'action humanitaire pour
sauver ]a vie d'6tages 6tait 16gitime quant h ses motifs et aux moyens
employ6s. Tel a 6t6 aussi l'avis du repr6sentant de la Bolivie . ..
Bastid, Remarques sur l'Interdiction d'Intervention, in MELANGES OFFERTS A
JuRAiJ ANDRASSY 13, 21 (1968).
Compare, Statement by Mr. Bouattoura (Algeria), cited in id., at 20. See also R. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD
329-31 & 334 (1968) [hereinafter cited as FALK]; The Congo Crisis, supra note
130, at 269 ff. & 273; De Schutter, supra note 130, at 23 & n.10.
186. BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 342. Mencer rejects the usefulness of analyzing whether one could or should distinguish between permissible and impermissible interventions:
I1est . . . impossible de continuer utilement la recherche scientifique de
cette questions [sic] au moyen d'une mfthode qui, bien qu'elle se soit accl~mte
es 6vd.Ie
d4a4
dpas~ese
et vi1ii
? iprsent, savoir [Riciau moyen de la m6thode de distinction d'interventions . . . selon la
forme (par exemple . . . intervention individuelle ou collective, 6co-

nomique, financ'aire, commerciale, id6ologique, humanitaire ou autres
[sic] . . . . Sous l'angle m6thodolog;que et, d'autant plus, sous l'aspect
th6orique . . . non seulement la forme, mais aussi le motif de l'intervention est sans importance . . . . A pr6sent, la th6orie artificielle des
soi-disants motifs l6gitimes est ensontenable [sic] . . . alle [sic] n'a
aucune justification scientifique . . . Aucune de ces "justifications"

n'affaiblit pas [sic] les consequences de la violation de la souverainetd
de l'Etat contre lequel l'intervention a 6t6 dirig6e . . .
Mencer, supra note 16, at 304-05. He concludes: "La science progressiste de
droit international s'oppose . . . i toutes les doctrines de l'intervention 16gitime."
Id., at 307.

187. See text accompanying note 150 supra.
188. Referring to the Organization of African Unity, Thapa observes:
The African Organization, a loose association of African States, lacks
among its members a coherence of aims and principles, so that it has
proven of little use in the handling of regional problems. Particularly,
inhuman treatment, unless at the hands of white rulers, does not come
among its list of immediate concerns; which casts doubts as to whether

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1974

43

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1974], Art. 8
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 4

humanitarian relief measures, 8 9 to remedy even extreme situations of human rights deprivations other than those involving apartheid or racial discrimination in a colonial or para-colonial context, 90 an increasing number of scholars have been seeking legal
and extra-legal arguments to justify unilateral humanitarian
operations.' 9 '

The approach which they have taken towards this problem
is not uniform and as a result two major strands can be distinguished. They can conveniently be described as the "double level" and the "legal" approach.
The proponents of the "double level" approach' 9 2 accept the
"'classic" view on the Charter prohibition of unilateral use of force
as a necessary corrollary to the attainment of what they see as
the United Nations' primary goal. That is, maintenance of inany collective action of the African organization for such purposes
would be forthcoming if the necessity arose.
Thapa, HumanitarianIntervention, 75 (1968) (unpublished thesis in McGill University Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as Thapal.
189. On this level as well, the United Nations has encountered serious difficulties in performing its task. See, e.g., on relief operations in Biafra: Remarks
by Beverley May Carl, in Biafra, Bengal, and Beyond: International Responsibility and Genocidal Conflict, 66 PROCEEDINGS AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 89, 103 ff.
(1972); Address by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, id., at 90. See generally Gottlieb, International Assistance to Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts, 4
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 403 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Gottlieb].
190. Even in a para-colonial situation such as Rhodesia, where the United
Nations has taken certain measures, their significance in terms of effectiveness in attaining their objective is, to say the least, questionable. See,
e.g., Statement of Senator Harry F. Byrd Jr., in Hearings on S.1404, U.N.
Sanctions Against Rhodesia-Chrome, Before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See generally SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH
AFRICA (R. Segal ed. 1964).
191. Jenks advocates that:
mhe world community must recognize the need . . . for external intervention in cases not covered by the right of self-defense as so defined
[in Article 51 of the Charter] in which a world interest or the conscience of mankind is involved. The world community cannot tolerate
acts of savagery on the ground that its civilised members have renounced the threat and use of force in their international relations.
JENKS, A NEW WORLD OF LAW? 30 (1969) [hereinafter cited as JENKS].
192. See generally the debates of the Charlottesville Conference on Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (March 11-12, 1972), reprinted in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 3-135 (R. Lillich ed.
1973). See also Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, id., at 13948 [hereinafter cited as Brownlie, Gunmen]; Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD (J. Moore ed. 1973). For
a rebuttal, see generally Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Dr.
Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD (J. Moore ed. 1973).
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ternational peace and security through elimination of all forceful
interactions between States that are not comprised among the
legal exceptions expressly mentioned in the Charter: individual
and collective self-defense and action in pursuance of a Chapter
VII decision. They feel compelled, in view of the already demonstrated inability or unwillingness of the international organizations to cope with such dramatic situations as Biafra or Bangladesh, to acknowledge that the absolute interpretation of the Charter prohibition on use of force by States is an unworkable and
unacceptable restriction upon last resort unilateral action in case
of extreme violation of the most fundamental human rights. Nevertheless, they are not prepared to depart from their allegiance to
their basic force-minimalization position and to consider an
eventually revived customary doctrine of humanitarian intervention which would fully legalize this kind of action as an additional
exception not explicitly provided for in the Charter. On the
other hand, they point to the lack of formal condemnation or
criticism on principle in the United Nations and in other international fora in such cases as the Stanleyville operation or the Indian
intervention in Bangladesh. From this they conclude that, in circumstances of extreme gravity, the world community, by its lack of
adverse reaction, in practice condones conduct which, although a
formal breach of positive legal norms, appears "acceptable" because of higher motives of a moral, political, humanitarian, or other
nature. 13 This lack of express condemnation in specific cases,
they submit, would in fact confer to such actions the character of
some kind of second-tier or sub-legality.'
Insofar as this approach purports to give an accurate description of the lex lata and its application, 9 5 not much can be raised
193. See Franck, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS
64 (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Frey-Wouters, id., at 107-08; Friedmann, id., at 114;
Wright, The Legality of Intervention Under the United Nations Charter, 51 PROCEEDINGS AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 77, 81 (1957); Remarks by Louis Henkin, supra
note 149, at 96.
194. See Lillich, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS
61-62 & 118 (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Falk, id., at 68-69. Compare, on the subject
of reprisals which raises similar, if not stronger, problems of justification under
the U.N Charter: Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 415, 430 n.39 (1969); Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-11 & 26 (1972).
195. See, e.g., on the absence of formal condemnation of India in the Bangladesh context: Nanda, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NAAmong the numerous draft proposals submitted
TIONS 99 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
between 1962 and 1970 by Member States of the United Nations on the question
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against it. When, however, its proponents condone it, so to say
de lege ferenda, as the most suitable system for attaining a fair
balance between the seemingly contradictory goals of protection
of human rights in extreme cases and maintenance of a peaceful
world order, 1 96 this author cannot agree.
The main arguments which have been advanced in support

of this approach comprise: 19 7 fear of abusive invocation of a fully
legalized doctrine of humanitarian intervention; practical restraints upon the conduct of States due to the necessity of, at
least "technical" breach of the law; clarity and simplicity of the
general rule of total prohibition of armed intervention, coupled
with the fear that recognition of an exception for humanitarian
motives might "erode the psychological constraints of the use of
force for other purposes;"' 9 and, concordance with the present
of further articulating Charter norms on the prohibition of force, both in the
6th Committee and in the Special Committee on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, none explicitly
provided for any exceptions not specifically envisaged by the Charter. Only one
such draft, submitted by the United Kingdom, specified in its written commentary
that its paragraph 5, embodying the two Charter exceptions (article 51 and
Chapter VII) in a broad interpretation, was intended to "set . . . out in a
non exhaustive manner the principal circumstances in which the use of force
is lawful."
Commentary, United Kingdom Proposal, 19 U.N. GAOR, Sp.
Comm. on Fr. Rel., U.N. Doc. A/A.C.119/L.8, at 4 (1964) (emphasis added).
196. Compare, Prof. Moore's distinction between the respective intellectual
tasks of description of what the law is and recommendation as to what it ought
to be. Moore, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 12021 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
197. See generally Farer, Humanitarian Intervention-The View from Charlottseville, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 149, 152
& 155-57 (R. Lillich ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Farer, Humanitarian Intervention]; Brownlie, Gunmen, eupra note 192, at 147-48; Franck, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS

14, 64 & 89 (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Falk,

id., at 33; Frey-Wouters, id., at 107-08; FALK, supra note 185, at 161; Gottlieb,
supra note 189, at 415 & n.48.
198. Farer, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 197, at 152. Another argument sometimes advanced is the likelihood of humanitarian intervention actually causing more harm than benefits to the people it is intended to assist. Franck,
for instance, observes that:
[Tihere is a strong indication that more people died in Bangladesh during the two or three weeks when the Indian Army was liberating the
country than had been killed previously.
Franck, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 65 (R.
Lillich ed. 1973). See also Farer, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 197, at
152. Finally, it has been argued that a flat prohibition of humanitarian intervention might have the beneficial effect of inducing States to resort to (non-coercive)
measures at an earlier stage so as to prevent the situation from deteriorating and
reaching such proportions that armed intervention becomes the only effective

remedy left. Franck, in

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS

104-05 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).

Contra, Lillich, in id., at 109.
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state of the law.
So far as the fear of abuse is concerned, this author must
confess that he is unable to see how a "double level" theory,
recognizing the permissibility of certain illegalities, would in any
respect reduce the opportunities for abusive utilization. It seems
likely that a clearly stated rule, restricting by a set of precise
criteria the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention to certain
well-defind, specific situations, would provide a far stronger incentive for a State to refrain from intervening in a situation or in a
manner falling short of the requirements set forth for its legality.
This would be much more effective than would a system in which
the prospective intervenor knows that, regardless of his motives, he
breaches the law, but can hope that the world community will
remain silent as a result of apathy or political division, and thus
implicitly condone his intervention, however selfish its purposes
may have been. 199
Such a situation would certainly enhance neither clarity
nor predictability. An absolute prohibition undermined by creeping exceptions puritanically called "acceptable breaches" seems
hardly more straightforward in application than a rule which openly
recognizes some limited and strictly defined exceptions, by permitting appraisal and eventual characterization of the conduct of an
intervenor as unlawful.
In addition, "[it would indeed be wrong to unnecessarily
brand conduct unlawful which is morally justified."2 ' This could
199. Significant is Prof. Franck's rationale for opposing legal recognition of
humanitarian intervention:
[A]s a lawyer I would prefer to advise politicians contemplating such
intervention to look to political rather than legal justifications and mitigation. Political leaders who are contemplating unilateral military intervention should not be encouraged to believe that international law
is firmly on their side. It is not. At best, it is unclear. They could
still take their chances on a cogent political justification being accepted
as genuine by the internationalcommunity.

Franck in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 64 (R. Lillich
ed. 1973) (Emphasis added).
200. Bogen, supra note 131, at 303. This author does not wish to go as far
as Bogen who, referring to the absence of any action by the world community
prior to World War II regarding the persecutions of Jews in Nazi Germany, contends that law-abiding nations could be dissuaded from intervening for humanitarian reasons in situations genuinely requiring it, by the absence of an
applicable legal exception to the general rule of prohibition of the use of force,
and accordingly criticizes the "absolute" interpretation of article 2(4) on that
ground.

Id.

Compare, Farer, HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 197, at 160

and Franck, in HUMANITARIAN
Lillich ed. 1973).

INTERVENTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS
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only encourage States to run the risk, break the law, invoke some
vague, plausible higher motive, and hope that the world community will fail to censor their conduct. In the long run such
a situation must inevitably lead to an increasing authority deflation of international law in general, and of the Charter in particular. 20 1 If States can "acceptably" break the law for humanitarian reasons, why should it not be equally tolerable to violate
it for other, perhaps morally less commendable motives as well?
Thus it seems that the only real advantage of the "double
level" approach is its complete correspondence with the present
state of the law, integrating at the same time the strict theoretical
prohibition of unilateral use of force for any reason not amounting
to self-defense, and the practice of non-condemnation of at least
some types of "technical" violations of this norm. In view of
the various disadvantages this theory entails, it might be advisable
in assessing what the law ought to be, to frame the recommended
rule in such a way as to attach the label of lawfulness to what
20 2
is deemed acceptable.
In view of the highly improbable character of a Charter revision expressly integrating unilateral use of force for humanitarian purposes as an additional exception to the general prohibition of use of force by States, those scholars who want the legality
of past and future instances of humanitarian operations recognized, have tried to find bases in the Charter, as it presently
stands, to support their contention.
The Thomases, in rather cautious terms, conclude that:
In spite of a recognition of a right of humanitarian intervention by customary international law, strict principles of
modern multilateral treaty law may have completely abol20s
ished the right ....
Nevertheless, in connection with article 51 of the Charter, they contend that:
201. See Prof. Falk's description of this approach as "advocating civil disobedience on an international level." Falk, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND THE UNITED NATIONS 108 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
See also the euthanasia
and marijuana laws parallels referred to by Prof. Lillich in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 62, 117 & 118 (R. Lillich ed. 1973)
and Dr. Brownlie, in Brownlie, Gunmen, supra note 192, at 146.
202. Compare, Farer, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 197, at 160;
Baxter, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 54 (R. Lillich
ed. 1973); Almond, id., at 133 & 134.
203. THoMAs & THOMAS, supra note 7, at 20 (emphasis added).
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A plea can be made that where it is legal to intervene
to protect one's own nationals, it is an extension of this legality to protect the nationals of others. The so-called principle
of nationality is not inflexible... 204

They seemingly endorse the often invoked argument that selfhelp to protect one's own nationals can be deemed included in
the "inherent" right of self-defense retained by article 51,205 and

go on to extend this permissibility through an "ancillarity-like"
rationale to cover situations in which the nationality link is missing.200

Attractive though this reasoning might be, particularly in
those cases where a State, intervening to rescue some of its own

nationals, avails itself of the opportunity to save other foreigners
as well,2 0 7 this author has serious reservations regarding this approach. For one thing, it is by no means certain that even protection of nationals can properly be taken to fall within the purview

of self-defense as defined in article 51.208 Secondly, from a pol204. Id.
205. See, e.g., BOWETT, supra note 7, at 91-105; D. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 673 (1970) [hereinafter cited as GREaI]; STONE, supra note 151, at 94-97;
A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 162 (1963);
Fenwick, InternationalLaw, supra note 131, at 27; Fenwick, Dominican Republic,
supra note 131, at 64. See also Report of the 6th Comm., 18 U.N. GAOR,
This
Annexes, Agenda Item 71, U.N. Doe. A/5671, at 34, para. 61 (1963).
rationale has also been relied upon by the United Kingdom in support of its
intervention in the 1956 Suez crisis. See, e.g., Statement of Prime Minister
Eden in the British House of Commons, cited in Fawcett, Intervention in International Law (Hague Academy of International Law), 103 RECUEIL DES COURS
347, 400 (1961).
206. Compare, Responsibility of States for Damage Done in their Territories to the Person or Property of Foreigners, Report of the League of Nations
Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, SubCommitee on State Responsibility, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 177, 182 (Spec. Supp.
1926), cited in THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 7, at 20.
207. Particularly when the State whose nationals have been rescued by the
intervenor supports or condones the latter's actions, very little can be asserted
against the legality of this type of "simultaneous rescue" operation, provided the
intervention of the acting State for the protection of its own nationals and is
deemed legal in the first place. The operation might then be considered to have
been carried out on behalf of all the States involved, and therefore within the
scope of collective self-defense. Compare, statements cited in note 211 infra.
208. "The extent to which the right to self-defense includes a right of protection over nationals abroad . . . has been, and in a lesser degree remains, the
subject of acute controversy." JENKS, supra note 191, at 30. See also BROWNLIE,
supra note 17, at 429 ff. The terms of article 51, taken literally, require (1)
an armed attack (2) directed against the State. This seems to make it rather
difficult to "equate protection of nationals abroad with the preservation of the
state itself." Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 336. On the other hand, the
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icy perspective, the inclusion of self-help to protect nationals
abroad in the right of self-defense of the State itself, does raise
some serious questions. To the extent that this broad view of
self-defense emphasizes the functional character of the State" 9
as an institution whose goals and interests only acquire a real content through their relationship with the interests and security of its
constituting elements, namely man, this author agrees. The real
danger of equating self-help to protect individuals abroad with selfdefense of the State as a whole, however, lies in its potential to
incite States to disregard any notion of proportionality and to resort
to force as soon as even a very small group of their nationals is endangered. Likewise, where the size of the threatened group would
genuinely justify drastic measures of protection, to use an amount
of force unrelated to the extent of the actual hardship to be prevented.210 And thirdly, this rationale seems hardly applicable to
those situations in which the violations reach the most dramatic
proportions, namely where the victims are nationals of the State
committing the violations. Foreign intervention will then by and
large have to take place contrary to the wishers of that State's govqualification of the term self-defense as an "inherent right" could be taken to
indicate that article 51 merely restates the customary right to self-defense, which
traditionally did include self-help in situations not amounting to an armed attack
upon the State. This is illustrated by the now classic formulation of self-help
by Webster in relation to the incident of the steamer Caroline in 1837: "[A]
necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and
no moment for deliberation." U.S. Secretary of State Webster, cited in Nanda,
supra note 131, at 48 (emphasis added). Some support for a broader interpretation of article 51 beyond the plain meaning of its terms can also be found in the
I.C.J.'s qualified acceptance of the legality of the initial measures taken by the
United Kingdom in the Corfu Channel incident. Corfu Channel Case, [1949]
I.C.J. 4, 30. Compare, McDougal, Authority to Use Force on the High Seas,
20 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 19, 28-29, cited in Lillich, Intervention, supra

note 7, at 217 n.58:
I'm ashamed to confess that at one time I lent my support to the suggestion that article 2(4) and the related articles did preclude the use
of self-help less than self-defense. On reflection, I think that . . . article 2(4) and article 51 must be interpreted differently .

. .

.

In the

absence of collective machinery to protect against attack and deprivation, I would suggest that the principle of major purposes requires an
interpretation which would honor self-help against prior unlawfulness.
See generally BRIERLY, supra note 7, at 416 ff.; L. GooDRicH & E. HAMBRO,
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 229 nn.
(1949); H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 791 (1950); STONE,
supra note 151, at 98 ff. For statements by national representatives in the
United Nations, rejecting a broad interpretation of article 51, see Fonteyne, supra
note 146, at 217 & nn.79-81.
209. Compare, notes 95-96 supra and accompanying text.
210. Compare, Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 337 & n.77.
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ernment, thus eliminating any possibility of rational invocation of
collective self-defense, however 'broadly one stretches the concept.2 11 Unlike in a protection-of-nationals case, the absence of
any transnational connection other than general international concern with human rights, excludes characterization of such cases
as even minimally threatening, directly or indirectly, the intervening State's interests or security. Unless one transposes to the
inter-State level the encouraging but somewhat artificial threat
to the peace rationale utilized by the United Nations to justify
mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia, 212 it appears extremely difficult to vindicate resort to measures of self-help in this context.
The more commonly taken approach combines three main
arguments: restrictive interpretation of the article 2(4) prohibition; balancing out of the Charter's major purposes; and limited
invocation of the non-realization of the basic expectations of the
right
Members of the United Nations when they renounced their
21
under customary international law to use force unilaterally. 3
Article 2(4) of the Charter, it is argued, should be interpreted in accordance with its plain language, so as to prohibit
the threat or use of force only when directed at the territorial
integrity or political independence of a State. 214 Taken in con211. Compare, statements by national representatives in the United Nations,
justifying assistance to colonial peoples on the basis of an extended collective
self-defense rationale, in Fonteyne, supra note 146, at 213-14, nn.67-69. See
also id., at 214 n.70. See generally Payne, Sub-Saharan Africa: The Right of
Intervention in the Name of Humanity, 2 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 77 (1972).
212. The Security Council, in declaring the Rhodesian situation to constitute
a threat to the peace, recognized that deprivations of human rights and of the
right to self-determination on the internal level, could threaten international
r
;
of nibig
tions
freI
Thuese .. d. i
security
... cand
other States. See generally Fenwick, When Is There a Threat to the Peace?Rhodesia, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 753 (1967); Franck, Policy Paper on the Legality
of Mandatory Sanctions by the United Nations Against Rhodesia, CENTER FOR
INT'L STUDIES, PUB. No. 1 (1968); McDougal & Reisman, supra note 169; Robinowitz, U.N. Application of Selective Mandatory Sanctions Against Rhodesia: A Brief Legal and Political Analysis, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 147 (1967). Contra, Acheson, supra note 169.
213. See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 7, at 16; Lillich, Self-Help, supra
note 7, at 334 ff.; Lillich, Forcible Self-Help under InternationalLaw, 22 NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE REV. 56 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Lillich, Forcible Self-Help];
Lillich, Intervention, supra note 7, at 210 ff.; McDougal & Reisman, supra note
7; Perez-Vera, supra note 139; Reisman, supra note 4; Thapa, supra note 188.
This author has attempted to integrate in one theory various arguments advanced
by the above scholars. This does not mean, however, that each of them explicitly articulates the whole range of arguments in this article, or would necessarily
agree with every contention made in the following exposition.
214. "A close reading of [article 2(4)] will indicate that the prohibition
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nection with article 51, this would mean that these two provisions
are not necessarily complementary, in that situations might arise
in which armed force is utilized unilaterally neither against the

political independence of territorial integrity of any State, nor in
the exercise of the inherent right or individual or collective selfdefense. Specifically, "[s]ince a humanitarian intervention seeks
neither a territorial change nor a challenge to the political independence of the State involved,"2 1 and particularly in view of
the closing words of article 2(4) referring to the purposes of the
Charter, this specific modality of the use of force is "not only
not inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations but is

rather in conformity with the most fundamental peremptory
norms of the Charter. 2 16
This position does not overlook the various policy problems
raised by this interpretation of article 2(4), one of the major
ones being that this approach would necessitate a case by case
appraisal of the alleged motivation and purposes of any action
claimed to fall under the exception. This would not of course

simplify the norm or its application in practice.

17

is not against the use of coercion per se, but rather the use of force for specified unlawful purposes. . . ." Reisman, supra note 4, at 177. Compare, statements by national representatives in the United Nations, in Fonteyne, supra note
146, at 214 & n.71.
215. Reisman, supra note 4, at 177. See also Lillich, Self-Help, supra note
7, at 336; Lillich, supra note 213, at 63; Perez-Vera, supra note 139, at 415.
216. Reisman, supra note 4, at 177. He concludes: "[I]t is a distortion
to argue that [humanitarian intervention] is precluded by article 2(4)." Id. See
also Perez-Vera, supra note 139, at 415. Lillich argues that "[c]ertainly, if a
construction of the Charter, namely article 2(4), will further human rights, it
Compare, Claude,
is a proper construction." Lillich, supra note 213, at 63.
in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 42 (R. Lillich ed.
1973); statements by national representatives in the United Nations, in Fonteyne, supra note 146, at 215 & n.73. Contra, statements in the United Nations,
id., at 215-16, nn. 74-76; JENKS, supra note 191, at 29; GREIG, supra note 205,
at 668. See also note 179 supra and accompanying text. The same apparent
contradiction of purposes can be found in recent restatements of the nonintervention principle by the U.N. General Assembly, such as the Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), 20 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014, at 11 (1965), and the Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-opertaion
Among States, G.A. Res. 265 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 28, U.N. Doc.
A/8028, at 121 (1970). See generally Note, A Proposed Resolution Providing
for the Authorization of Intervention by the United Nations, a Regional Organization, or a Group of States in a State Committing Gross Violations of Human Rights, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 340, 342 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Proposed
Resolution].
217. For statements by national representatives in the United Nations, see
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From the standpoint of text interpretation as well, the argument can be criticized, for this approach takes the words "against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State" to refer to the motives and goals of the State resorting to force. Article
2(4), on the other hand, does not indicate that it relates to the
intentions of the parties.21 8 In fact, even in those limited cases
of rescue of foreigners, where it is possible for the intervenor
to pull out very quickly without really affecting the internal authority structures of the State intervened in, armed intervention
will still inevitably constitute a temporary violation de facto of the
latter's territorial integrity and, to a certain extent, of its political independence, if carried out against its wishes. In most instances of
humanitarian intervention on behalf of peoples deprived of their
most fundamental human rights by or with the approval of their
own government, the infringement upon the State's territorial integrity and political independence will be far more serious. Achievement of a lasting solution in such cases will usually require a change
of government or even a secession, so that the foreign intervention
will have had to fundamentally influence the domestic political
process and organization of the State intervened in.
Considering article 2(4) in the broader perspective of the
major purposes of the Charter,2 1 9 and specifically in view of the
closing words of paragraph 4,220 there is clearly a need for balancing the sometimes opposite goals of conflict-minimalization and
protection of human rights. 221 Espousing Professor Lillich's view
Fonteyne, supra note 146, at 209-11 & nn.54-58. On the other hand, an appraisal of these and other subjective elements is already needed with the present
"classic" approach towards the Charter prohibition of force. The validity of a
claim that a certain conduct falis under the article 5i exception of seif-defense
cannot meaningfully be assessed by applying merely mechanical tests. See, e.g.,
Statement by Mr. Chaumont (France), 25 U.N. GAOR, Spec. Comm. on Aggression, U.N. Doc. A/A.C.134/S.R.57, at 36 (1970). However, the traditional
Soviet "chronological" approach towards the determination of acts of aggression
could be adopted. See, e.g., Draft U.S.S.R. Resolution, 9 U.N. GAOR, Annexes,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.332/Rev.1, at 6-7 (1954).
218. Jenks notes that:

The reference to 'territorial integrity or political independence' can be
so construed as to introduce an element of ambiguity into the obligation

[to refrain from the threat or use of force] but not reasonably so as

to substitute a subjective test of intention for the objective test of the
nature and effect of the action taken.
JENKS, supra note 191, at 28-29.
219. See U.N. CHARTER, Preamble, paras. 1 & 2, and art. 1, paras. I & 3.
220. But see authorities in notes 179 and 216 supra.
221. Reisman, however, advocates that:
The preamble and critical first Article of the Charter, framed in the
awful shadow of the atrocities of the war, left no doubt as to the inti-
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that "a prohibition of violence is not an absolute virtue 222 and
that "it has to be weighed against other values as well, 22 3 Professors McDougal and Reisman contend that:
The continuing authority of community expectations
about the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention is greatly
confirmed by all the contemporary developments associated
with the United Nations. The repeated, insistent emphasis
upon its underlying policies can only be regarded as strength224
ening, not weakening, the historic remedy.
Referring in particular to articles 55225 and 56226 of the Charter,
which they interpret as transforming the general commitment of
U.N. Members to human fights into "an active obligation for joint
and separate action, 2 27 they submit that:
[T]he cumulative effect of the Charter in regard to the basic
policies of the customary institution of humanitarian intervention is to create a coordinate responsibility for the active
protection of human rights: members may act jointly with
the Organization in what might be termed a new organized,
explicitly conventional humanitarian intervention or singly or
collectively in the customary or international common law
humanitarian intervention. Any other interpretation would
major purposes for
be suicidally destructive of the explicit 22
8
which the United Nations was established.
And conclude that:
Insofar as it is precipitated by intense human rights deprivations and conforms to the general international legal
regulations governing the use of force--economy, -timeliness,
commensurance, lawfulness of purpose, and so on-[humanitarian intervention] represents a vindication of internamate nexus that the framers perceived to link international peace and

security and the most fundamental human rights of all individuals. Reisman, supra note 4, at 171.
Compare authorities in note 292 infra and accompanying text.
222. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 213, at 65.
223. Id.

224. McDougal & Reisman, supra note 7, at 442.
225.

The Charter provides that:

"[T]he United Nations shall promote . . .

universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." U.N. CHARTER,
art. 55.
226. "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in

cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55." U.N. CHARTER, art. 56 (Emphasis added).
227. McDougal & Reisman, supra note 7, at 444.
228. Id.
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tional law... 229
Furthermore, since "[the] great expectations of the immediate postwar period have not materialized, ' 23 0 in that the machinery for collective security and enforcement envisaged by the
States ratifying the Charter has in fact not been established,2 3 '
one might wonder whether a State would not be entitled to challenge the absolute validity of the Charter prohibition of force and
fall back upon the traditional doctrine of humanitarian intervention in those exceptional cases of extreme human rights deprivations.2 32
As long as the necessity of strictly defining and limiting the
circumstances in which States could rely upon this latitude is kept
in mind, would it not be advisable to consider the present poten229. Reisman, supra note 4, at 177.
230. Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 335. These hopes have been cruelly
deceived in that no article 43 agreements have been concluded, the Security
Council is often paralyzed on important issues by the crippling and constant use
of the veto, and the agenda of the General Assembly has been virtually monopolized by the "new" nations for discussion of colonial and para-colonial subjects.
Compare, Baxter, in

HUMANITARIAN

INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS

53-

54 (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Lillich, id., at 61.
231. Arguably, the establishment of machinery for collective security and enforcement was so basic a condition for the Members of the United Nations in
surrendering their right under customary international law to use force for a variety of reasons, that failure by the Organization to create this machinery would

partially relieve the Member States of their obligation of restraint under the
Charter. See, e.g., Statement of Mr. Shahi (Pakistan), 23 U.N. GAOR, 6th
Comm., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/S.R.1080, at 9, para. 68 (1968). As Prof. Stone's
views regarding the Charter prohibition of force indicate, an outright "contractlike" approach to the Charter could prove extremely hazardous in that this might
totally undermine the conflict minimalization structure which, for the first time in
,istory, has -en. cstablishd through the replacmnt Of tc criterin..."ust,
war" by that of self-defense. See generally STONE, supra note 151. Compare,
JENKS, supra note 191, at 30: "Injustice, subjectively determined, does not justify
the threat or use of force to protect or enforce rights which the community has
not yet evolved adequate means of securing." See also Henkin, Force, Intervention, and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law, 57 PROCEEDINGS AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. 147, 148-49 (1963).

232. In reference to this possibility, Thapa states that:
[A]n absolutist view, that the Charter has abolished the customary
principle of humanitarian intervention, is not defensible-this principle
continues to exist as an exception to all rules, whether set forth by
customary or conventional international law, which bans forceful intervention for such purpose.
Thapa, supra note 188, at 13. Writing against the background in view of the
Biafran crisis, and listing the various types of intervention permissible under the
U.N. Charter, Adaramola concludes: "It seems that in extreme conditions humanitarian intervention will be justified." Adaramola, The Nigerian Crisis and
Foreign Intervention: A Focus on International Law, 4 NIGERIAN L.J. 76, 78

(1970).
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tials of the international organizations? Similarly, it seems reasonable to recognize legally, that in certain extreme situations,

when neither the United Nations nor the competent regional organization can or wants to assume its responsibilities, a State may
be temporarily relieved of its obligation of restraint under article

2(4)233 so as to provide a form of "substitute or functional enforcement of international human rights. 234
V.

CRITERIA FOR APPRAISAL OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Various scholars have, in recent times, formulated modernized criteria for appriasal of the legality of alleged cases of hu-

manitarian intervention.235 While overlapping on a large number
of points, the proposed norms, nevertheless, show some significant
variations. This author will attempt to reconcile and supplement
them in three major groups: substantive, procedural, and preferential criteria.
A.

Substantive Criteria

1. Characteristicsof the Situation Warranting Humanitarian
large-scale depriIntervention: limitation to ongoing or imminent
2 6
vations of the most fundamental human rights. 1

a) Fundamental character of the human rights involved:
Without going as far as Professor Perez-Vera who considers only

the right to life sufficiently essential to warrant a departure by a
State from the principle of prohibition to force, -37 this author believes that a balance must be struck between the amount of destruc233. As early as 1949 Jessup envisaged this possibility:
It would seem that the only possible argument against the substitution
of collective measures under the Security Council for individual measures by a single state would be the inability of the international organization to act with the speed requisite to preserve life.
JESSUP, supra note 169, at 169. But see Brownlie, Gunmen, supra note 192,
at 145-46.
234. Reisman, supra note 4, at 178.
235. See Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 347 ft.; Moore, The Control
of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205, 263-64
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Moore]; Nanda, supra note 131, at 475; Perez-Vera,
supra note 139, at 416 ff. See generally Reisman, supra note 4; Thapa, supra
note 188. Compare discussion and authorities in notes 87 ff. supra and accompanying text.
236. Reisman generally refers to an "overriding necessity" for intervention.
Reisman, supra note 4, at 193. Compare, De Schutter, supra note 130, at 2829, requiring a "breach . . . of a certain qualitative and quantitative gravity."
See also ProposedResolution, supra note 216, at 357-61.
237. Perez-Vera, supra note 139, at 418.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol4/iss2/8

56

Fonteyne: The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Interven
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

tion which almost inevitably will be caused by armed intervention,
and the importance of the human rights sought to be protected.
This weighing process tends to result in a restriction, in principle,
of the permissibility of humanitarian intervention to those situations where there is a threat to, or deprivation of the most fundamental types of human rights, such as the right to life or the
23 8
freedom from torture.
b) Exceptionally large scale of the human rights deprivations:
To the extent that unilateral resort to force for humanitarian
motives is to be considered "an exceptional measure, available
as a last resort to prevent irreparable injury,"2 39 armed intervention should only be permissible "when a substantial deprivation
of human values"2 4 is involved. While "[j]ust counting heads . . .
is not sufficient for decision-making purposes,"2 4 ' the number of
people affected by the human rights violations is not completely
irrelevant. There ought to be a reverse correlation between the
latter and the seriousness of the violated human rights: 242 , the
larger the number of people involved, the more readily will a
deprivation of a lesser fundamental human right provide sufficient justification for intervening.
Analyzing each specific case in a cost-benefit fashion, it
would be necessary, "using the principles of relativity and proportionality as guidelines,"2'43 to balance the destruction intervention would cause and the size of the group affected by the violations, as well as the fundamental character of the threatened human rights. Additionally, the degree of potential persistency of
9".R

M ore requie

s

a threat "tn fuindamental hinmn rights,

artrhlarilv

threat of widespread loss of human life." Moore, supra note 235, at 264 (emphasis added). See also Moore, in HUmANITARiAN INTERVENTION AND THE
UNITED NATIONS 49 (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at
348.
239. BowETT, supra note 7, at 98 (emphasis added).
240. Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 348. Perez-Vera limits it to "des

crimes sp6cialement r6voltants, d'une cruaut6 extreme .. . ou bien des massacres de nature h blesser ]a conscience de l'humanit6." Perez-Vera, supra note
139, at 418. Thapa refers to "a substantial threat to a large number of persons. . .

."

Thapa, supra note 188, at 67.

Reisman requires "a grave threat

to minimum human rights." Reisman, supra note 4, at 187. See also Moore,
supra note 235, at 264.
241. Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 348.
242. "[I]t
is necessary to examine the type as well as the extent of human
rights deprivation .... ." Id. See also Claydon, in HUMANITARIAN INRVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 91-93 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
243. Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 348.
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the situation and the chances of independent internal solution of
the problem should be taken into consideration.24 4
c) Immediacy of the human rights violations: Being an extraordinary measure of last resort, humanitarian intervention would
be justified only when "the substantial deprivation . . .

has oc-

curred or is threatened."24' 5 However, a problem of perception and
appraisal arises. While the seriousness of the situation can by and
large be assessed once the deprivations are taking place, whether a
threatened violation actually turns into physical violence must
necessarily remain a matter for speculation. This is particularly
applicable if this potential development is in fact prevented by a
foreign intervention allegedly justified by this danger.
However, since:
[T]he main basis of humanitarian intervention is the protection of humanity, there cannot be a principle forcing the intervening party to wait until -the destructive act has been
committed. Such intervention being preventive rather than
punitive, the existence of the imminent danger is sufficient.
246

It would be illogical and inconsistent with the purpose of the intervention to require "a state . . . [to] wait for an actual violation to occur before taking preventive action. ' 24 7 The test must

be one of reasonableness: a good faith determination by the prospective intervenor that human rights violations are in fact imminently threatening, on the brink of evolving into actual mass deprivation.24 s
244. This might constitute an exceedingly difficult criterion to apply due to
its highly contingent and subjective character. Nevertheless, this author submits
that even in an extreme case of violation of the most fundamental human rights
of a large group of people (such as in the case of an organized policy of genocide carried out by the local authorites), foreign intervention of a forceful nature would probably not be warranted if there is a reasonable prospect that the
deprivations will end in the immediate future as a result of internal political
or other processes. The preservation of values to be achieved by intervention
must be weighed against the extent of the disruption of internal structures and
domestic processes which will necessarily result from the foreign action. In such
a case, this author would certainly oppose anything beyond preservation measures
merely intended to allow the domestic process of resolution of the crisis to operate without the hardship and cost in human values it might otherwise have been
accompanied with.
245. Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 348. Compare, Moore's reference
to "[a]n immediate and extensive threat .......
Moore, supra note 235, at 264
(emphasis added).
246. Thapa, supra note 188, at 40 (emphasis added).
247. Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 348.
248. Compare, Proposed Resolution, supra note 216, at 361-62. Perez-Vera
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2. CharacteristicsRelating to the Motivation of the Intervening State: "relative" disinterestedness-As one writer observes:
The States are not generally responsive to the call of humanity at the risk of incurring blame for intervention, unless
they are9 also motivated by other and more selfish considera24
tions.
Disinterest is indeed "a highly altruistic principle [and] as
such . . . practicable only for individuals but not to an entity
like a state."2 5 If an opportunity is to be maintained for States
to intervene in human rights situations without breaking the law,
it seems surely "naive," 5' to use Professor Lillich's terms, and
unrealistic to require that "where the decision to intervene falls
to a single state, it should be safeguarded by a requirement that
the state be totally disinterested. '25 2 The presence, among the
reasons of the intervenor, of some considerations of national interest should not be taken to necessarily "invalidate the resort
to [force] if the overriding motive is the protection of human
rights." '
further requires that the violation of human rights be "imputable & la puissance
publique elle-mhme," and this "aussi bien par une action que par une omission." Perez-Vera, supra note 139, at 418. This author is compelled to disagree
with this criterion, undoubtedly inspired by the traditional principles of State responsibility for injury to aliens, applied by analogy. It disregards the essentially remedial character of humanitarian intervention and introduces the
notions of guilt regarding the State intervened in and of a right of punishment
on the part of the intervening State. From a pragmatic point of view, it would
seem to put an undue limitation on the protection of human rights by foreign
intervention in situations where the deprivations are the result of, for instance,
persistent public unrest which the local authorities are unable, not unwilling, to
control, or of violence exerted by a portion of the population in rebellion against
the de jure government.

Compare, De Schutter, supra note 130, at 29.

See also

Farer, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 66 (R. Lillich
ed. 1973), referring to a possible distinction "between the case where the threat
[to human rights] is the consequence of governmental action and the case where
it is the result of a breakdown in government."
249. Thapa, supra note 188, at 14-15. See also id., at 86-87. Compare,
authorities in note 128 supra and accompanying text.
250. Thapa, supra note 188, at 83. Compare, Moore, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVEmION AND THE UNITED NATIONS, at 30 & 70 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
251.

Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 350.

252. Bogen, supra note 131, at 311. See also Perez-Vera, supra note 139,
at 416.
253. Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 350. Thapa rejejcts the current relevance of the requirement of absolute disinterestedness, as included in the traditional doctrine of humanitarian intervention, on the basis that this criterion has
[Nlot been able to play a convincing role. The [reason] mainly being
that . . . the U.N., as a proper agency (having assimilated . . . [this
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3. Characteristicsof the Intervention Itself.
a) No unnecessary force: 2 54 This criterion is in fact an application of the general principles of necessity and proportionality,25 5
and has a double aspect. For one thing, the intervening State
should not only utilize the modality of coercion required for the
achievement of the humanitarian objectives it seeks to attain.2 5 6 If
it then appears that recourse to armed force is unavoidable, the
intervenor should "employ only the amount of troops reasonably
necessary to accomplish the objective,"2 5 so as to reduce to a minimum the infringement upon the territorial integrity and political
independence of the State intervened in.
b) No unnecessary affectation of the authority structures of
the State intervened in: Closely related to the requirement of disinterestedness of the intervenor,25 s this criterion is again an application of the general principles referred to in the preceding paragraph. To the extent that it does not flatly prohibit any intentional impact upon the domestic political processes, it clearly
condition] in its constitution) of intervention for the sake of humanity,
has proven, at present, to be incapable of intervening as efficiently as
the States are able to.
Thapa, supra note 188, at 14. See also Proposed Resolution, supra note 216,
at 365-66. Contra, Gottlieb, supra note 189, at 416, requiring that "[glenuine
humanitarian intervention ... must be.

.

. kept free from political objectives."

254. See Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 349-50; Moore, supra note 235,
at 264; Nanda, supra note 131, at 475; Perez-Vera, supra note 139, at 420-21;
Reisman, supra note 4, at 177; Proposed Resolution, supra note 216, at 36768. See also Nanda, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS
78 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
255. Nanda, supra note 131, at 478. Compare, Reisman, supra note 4, at
193, requiring "compliance with the international law of the use of force."
256. Compare authorities in notes 264 ff. infra and accompanying text.
257. Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 349-50 (emphasis added). This criterion is particularly important, both for the appraisal a posteriori of the legality
of an actual intervention and for purposes of decision-making. In determining
whether to intervene for the protection of human rights in another State, governments should take into consideration the amount of force which the safe achievement of this objective is likely to require, and balance out the inevitable destruction this will cause against the value of the objective to be attained by it. Compare Moore, supra note 235, at 264, referring to "a proportional use of force
which does not threaten greater destruction of values than the human rights at
stake." On the different aspects of the proportionality principle in this context,
see generally the exchange between Profs. Franck, Weston, Nanda and Cardozo
(Moderator), in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 8-9 (R.
Lillich ed. 1973). See also Moore, id., at 50; Farer, id., at 7.
258. See authorities in notes 249 ff. supra and accompanying text. Nanda,
supra note 131, at 475, refers broadly to a "specific limited purpose." See also
Nanda, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 78 (R. Lillich
ed. 1973); Proposed Resolution, supra note 216, at 364-65.
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reflects the fundamental value-choice that human rights protection justifies at least some degree of interference with the
political independence and sometimes even territorial integrity of
the State intervened in.259 At the same time, it purports to limit
the lawfulness of extensive alteration by the intervenor of the
internal authority structures of that State, to those situations where

overthrow of the government in power or even secession of a
part of the population appears to be the only available means
of putting an end to ongoing or threatened human rights viola26 0
tions of particular gravity.

c) No unnecessary duration of the operation: Based on the
same principles as the previous two criteria, the requirement of
limited duration, 261 should be considered a relative one262 in that
removal of the intervening troops should be required only when the
objectives of the operation have been achieved 26 3-provided they
259. The importance of this fundamental value choice is highlighted by the
finding that "the most important abuses of human rights are those committed
by governments, and often by governments acting within their own territorial
domain." Falk, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 27
(R. Lillich ed. 1973). In further support of this basic value choice, McDougal
and Reisman invoke the reference in article 1(2) of the Charter to "[r]espect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples .... ." (Emphasis added). This would be enhanced by necessarily authority-oriented humanitarian intervention. McDougal & Reisman, supra note 7, at 442. But see
Adamarola, supra note 232, at 80-81:
It must be pointed out that the principle of self-determination has been
accepted by the United Nations as a lever of action for the liberation
of subject and dependent peoples of the world, and not as an instrument
for the dismemberment or desintegration of states.
260. See generally Farer, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 197, at 15354; Franck & Rodley, supra note 7, at 283. See also Proposed Resolution, supra
note 2!6, at 367. Compare, Moore, who implicitly limiting the practical possibility of lawful humanitarian intervention to mere rescue operations of nationals
of the intervening State, or eventually of third States, clarifies his requirement
of "minimal effect on authority structures" as follows:
If the protection of human rights requires the overthrow of authority
structures, it would seem best to require United Nations authorization
as a prerequisite for action. To allow unilateral action in such cases
would be to permit all manner of self-serving claims for the overthrow
of authority structures.

Moore, supra note 235, at 264. But see Moore, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND THE UNITED NATIONS 50 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
Compare, Remarks by
Louis Henkin, supra note 192, at 96.
261. Nanda, supra note 131, at 475. Compare, Perez-Vera, supra note 139,
at 420.
262. Lillich concludes merely that "[tihe longer the troops remain in another country, the more their presence begins to look as [political] intervention."
Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 350.
263. Moore formulates this requirement as follows: "[A] prompt disengagement consistent with the purpose of the action." Moore, supra note 235, at 264
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are at the same time lawful, realistic and necessary-or once there
has been an effective take-over by the United Nations or another

appropriate international organization.
B. ProceduralCriteria
1. Exhaustion of peaceful means of settlement.

6 4-In

view

of the United Nations' primary goal-conflict minimalizationand of the positive duty of its Members to seek a solution to
international disputes by peaceful means,26 recourse should be
had in the first instance to non-coercive methods of settlement 266 -through bilateral or multilateral diplomatic contacts or

resort to international organizations, including eventually non-governmental ones-unless there is clearly no time left for this type
of procedures because of the imminence of the violations.
2. Absence of any reasonable prospect of timely action by
an international organization.-Considering what Professor Sibert
' 267
calls "the subsidiary character of humanitarian intervention,
priority should always be given to the international organizations, 26 s both universal and regional, as the best suited instruments to represent the inclusive interests of the world community.
It seems indeed advisable that States should only be allowed to
resort to force unilaterally for the protection of human rights,
(emphasis added). Lillich advances an equally relative and flexible criterion:
withdrawal as soon as the mission is completed. Lillich, Self-Help, supra note
7, at 350. Compare, Proposed Resolution, supra note 216, at 366-67.
264. Nanda, supra note 131, at 475, refers to the "lack of any other recourse." Compare, Nanda, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED
NATIONS 78 (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Perez-Vera, supra note 139, at 419; Reisman,
supra note 4, at 179. See also De Schutter, supra note 130, at 29-30, setting
out a complete set of procedural steps to be taken by a prospective intervenor;
Proposed Resolution, supra note 216, at 349-50 & 364-65.
265. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 3. See also id., art. 1, para. 1, & art.
33.
266. Compare, Proposed Resolution, supra note 216, at 362-64.
267. 1 M. SIBERT, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 353 (1951).
Compare authority in note 234 supra and accompanying text.
268. "Wherever practicable any such intervention should be undertaken by
or on behalf of the United Nations, or through the appropriate regional organization ...... JENKS, supra note 191, at 30 (emphasis added). See also Reisman,
supra note 4, at 188; Proposed Resolution, supra note 216, at 357. Compare,

Falk, in

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS

68-69 (R. Lil-

lich ed. 1973); Moore, id., at 99. This seems particularly advisable in situations
where the solution of the human rights problem is likely to require fundamental
alterations of the authority structures of the State intervened in. See authority in
note 260 supra. But see De Schutter, supra note 130, at 31, who considers the
United Nations the only agent likely to carry out a humanitarian intervention
with sufficient guarantees of independence and disinterestedness.
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where the inevitable delay, still inherent in international decisionmaking as a result of the present structure and composition of
the United Nations and of other international organizations,2 69
would prevent timely action,270 or where it has become obvious
that the likelihood of such a body taking significant measures
to remedy the situation27 1 has actually become illusory.27 2
3. Immediate full reporting and submission to the appropriate international organization.-In order to ensure an acceptable degree of disinterest on behalf of the intervening State, and
to reduce the opportunities for abusive invocation to a minimum,
it is of fundamental importance that the intervenor's motives be
submitted without delay to the appraisal of the regional or world

community.27 3 In an attempt to avoid repetition of the jurisdictional conflicts between the United Nations and regional organizations,2 74 such as arose for example in the context of the 1965
269. Thapa argues that:
mhe regional organizations such as OAS, OAU . . . . as miniature
forms of collectivity, confront lesser problems than the universal collectivity of the United Nations, and could be helpful for maintaining regional peace and order. [T]he difficulty with this arrangement is that
regional organizations do not cover all geographical regions of the
world, and where they exist they do not fully represent the States
within the region. Interblock hostilities have penetrated into the activities of these organizations; each organization is dominated by one or
other rivals. Besides, the intra-regional rivalry among the members
themselves poses some practical difficulties in launching a unified action.
Compare, Frey-Wouters, in HuMANIThapa, supra note 188, at 71 and 73.

96 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).

TARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS

See

also note 188 supra.
270. Reisman, supra note 4, at 178 and 193.
271. "Collectivity of regional or universal organizations has not, up till now,
proven itself effective in taking over the task of humanitarian intervention."
Thapa, supra note 188, at 15.
272. Thapa concludes that:
In absence of armed sanctions, it seems too optimistic to hope that the
United Nations will ever be able to coerce the States to follow its pronouncements on human rights. As a result of the impotence of the
United Nations, the only possible means of protecting the life of nationals as well as foreigners can be said to have been left in the hands
of the States who have the might and means.

Id., at 68.

Compare, Weston, in HUMANITARIAN
(R. Lillich ed. 1973).

INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED

NATIONS 85-86

273.

Reisman, supra note 4, at 188 and 193.

TARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS

See also Nanda, in HUMANI-

78 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).

Com-

pare, Gottlieb, supra note 189, at 416, requiring authorization by "appropriate
international instruments."
274. See generally Moore, The Role of Regional Arrangements in the Maintenance of World Order, in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
122 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Moore, Regional Arrangements].
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intervention in the Dominican Republic, this author is inclined
to limit the obligation of reporting and submission to the Security
Council to the following five cases:
a) where no regional organization covers the area of the
world where the intervention occurs, or has jurisdiction over this
type of operation;
b) where the situation is not of a purely local nature, for
instance where the intervenor and the subject of the intervention
are not both members of the same regional organization;
c) where the regional organization, although competent, refuses to take jurisdiction over the case or fails, for whatever
reason, to take a stand on the matter within reasonable time;
d) where the Security Council itself, or the General Assembly, sees fit to assume jurisdiction and requests information;
e) where any of the parties directly involved voluntarily refers the case to the Security Council or General Assembly. In
all other instances, reporting and submission to the competent
organs of the appropriate regional organization would be suffi2 75
cient.
This solution is supported by various provisions of the Charter, 276 and would have the advantage of retaining the "primary
responsibility" of the Security Council in enforcement matters and
situations affecting international peace and security. At the same
time this would increase the chances to avoid, whenever possible,
interblock rivalries by leaving the regional organizations in charge
of purely local disputes, whenever the parties involved wish so and
2 77
no overriding universal community interest is at stake.
C.

PreferentialCriteria

1. Collective Action.-Even in the absence of action by
the universal or regional institutionalized community, collective
275. Compare, Reisman, supra note 4, at 191-92. Contra, Moore, requiring
"immediate full reporting to the Security Council and appropriate regional organizations."
Moore, supra note 235, at 264 (Emphasis added). See also
BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 299; JENKS, supra note 191, at 30; Proposed Resolution, supra note 216, at 349-50, 352-53 & 364-65.
276. Compare, U.N. CHARTER, arts. 24, para. 1, 52, para. 4, 34 and 35 with
arts. 52, paras. 1 & 3, and 53, para. 1. See also id., art. 103.

277. On the potential advantages of a regional approach over a universal
one, see Moore, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 100
(R. Lillich ed. 1973).

See generally Moore, Regional Arrangements, supra note

274.
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operations should be preferred over individual measures. 278
While it is true that "intervention does not gain in legality . . .
by being collective rather than individual, ' 27 9 there is nevertheless, a presumption 8. that collective action is more likely to ensure the relative purity of intentions required from the intervenors.

281

This criterion, however, is merely a statement of preference
meaning that, before taking action, a prospective intervenor is
expected to consult with other States and to attempt to obtain
their support and cooperation for the intervention. The requirement of collectivity cannot be an absolute one, 8 2 for lack of widespread interest on the part of other States for the ongoing or
threatened human rights deprivations should not leave the victims
unprotected. Provided both the causative situation and the conduct of the intervenor meet the standard set out earlier a single
State ought not, in principle, to be precluded from taking the
necessary steps to remedy the offending situation.
2. Invitation by or consent of the State intervened in.Technically, there is no intervention if the intervenor has been
asked in by, or obtained the consent of, the de jure government
of the State intervened in, provided at least the authorization or
278.

Reisman, supra note 4, at 188. See also Weston, in HUMANITARIAN
88 (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Proposed Resolution, supra note 216, at 371-73. It has even been argued that the big powers
should be barred from participation in humanitarian intervention so as to avoid
cold war involvement and reduce the likelihood of abusive utilization of the doctrine. Franck, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 33
(R. Lillich ed. 1973); Frey-Wouters, id., at 52; Rogers, id., at 71-72. It is arguable, however, that such a restriction would eliminate anly p...
u.l ...
y Of .an..
ian intervention to the extent that smaller nations would lack the necessary power
and resources to carry out a humanitarian operation on a large scale such as might
be required where the human rights deprivations cannot be remedied without
fundamental alteration of the authority structures of the state intervened in.
280. But see Thapa, supra note 188, at 14, who observes: "[I]f we take
a group or concert of States as a proper agency, the States even in this conjunction have never been disinterested with respect to other affairs of the State intervened." Compare, on collective decision-making in the United Nations: FriedINTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS

mann, in

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS

56 (R. Lillich

ed. 1973).
281. Thapa reasons that: "[By entrusting the power of decision to intervene
to a group of States, the requirement may reduce, though not eliminate, the risk
of an intervention which would primarily serve the aims of self-interest." Thapa,
supra note 188, at 42.
282. Reisman, supra note 4, at 178-79 and 188. See also Moore, in HuMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS

49 (R. Lillich ed. 1973);

Perez-Vera, supra note 139, at 416.
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invitation is clear and unambiguous. 28 3 However, the importance
of this criterion should not be overrated, 28 4 for two reasons:
a) Every invitation cannot be considered valid. Even express consent by an unquestionably authoritative government cannot always be retained as an automatic, fully conclusive test, since
it is always possible that it was granted only under pressure. 28 5
Furthermore, in certain cases particularly where various factions
are struggling for the power, and certainly in a clear civil strife
situation with uncertain issue, the representative character of the de
jure government may be questioned. 28 6 This is even more applicable where the invitation has actually been issued by some de
facto authority in rebellion against the "legal" government.
b) Absence of consent,
[w]hen a considerable number of human beings . . . are in
imminent danger of destruction or mulilation due to the existence of an unlawful element in the State, and especially
when the alleged act has been committed deliberately by the
government of the State intervened into, 287
should not be taken to preclude the possibility of lawful humanitarian intervention, provided the other requirements of legality
set out above have been fulfilled. Indeed,
[i]t seems certain that whether there is an express right under the terms of [a] treaty, or express consent of the State,
they are simply among the evidence in support of an act
of humanitarian intervention, and are not the essential pre288
requisite for such an act.
283. See, e.g., Brownlie, Gunmen, supra note 192, at 144; Lillich, Self-Help,

supra note 7, at 349; Thapa, supra note 188, at 93-94.

See also discussion and

authorities in note 16 supra.

284. "[C]onsent of the State intervened is not the 'sine qua non' for . . .
legitimacy [of humanitarian intervention] . . . ." Thapa, supra note 188, at
94. See also Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 349; Moore, supra note 235,
at 264; Moore, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 4950 (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Nanda, id., at 78; Perez-Vera, supra note 139, at 417;
Reisman, supra note 4, at 187 n.88; Proposed Resolution, supra note 216, at
368-69.
285. Compare, Reisman, supra note 4, at 184.
286. See Thapa, supra note 188, at 100, and Reisman, supra note 4, at 184.
Compare, Moore, supra note 235, at 348, who restricts the validity of an invitation
by the constituted authorities to a pre-insurgency situation.
287. Thapa, supra note 188, at 94.

288. Id., at 104.
note 4, at 184-85.

Compare, on treaty rights of intervention, Reisman, supra
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VI.

CONCLUSION

In advocating recognition of a limited right of unilateral humanitarian intervention, this author is not unaware of the serious
dangers this approach entails, particularly the risk of abusive invocation. 289 But, as an early proponent of humanitarian intervention
pointed out almost a century ago: "It is a big mistake, in general,
to stop short of recognition of an inherently just principle, [merely]
because of the possibility of non-genuine invocation.

29 0

As long as the world community appears unable or unwilling
to promptly respond in a collective manner to those dramatic situations where the very nature and existence of man are threatened, individual initiatives by concerned States will have to be
relied upon if a viable world is to be maintained.2 91 Even minimum world public order, as the primary goal of the present international legal system, encompasses more than the sole elimination
of forceful interactions between States, and demands a certain
amount of justice and respect for the human person, as explicitly
referred to in the Preamble and in article 1 (3) of the U.N. Charter.
This implies, of course, a refusal to allot an absolute value to the
mere avoidance of armed conflict as such, and a conviction that
certain extreme situations justify and require a temporary departure
from a non-violent world order to achieve a more permanent stabilization of the world structure. As the Thomases put it:
289. De Schutter, supra note 130, at 26. This, coupled with the fear that
in some future instance a theory permitting intervention for humanitarian purposes might be invoked against them, seems to be the main reason why so many
States vehemently oppose this doctrine while at the same time, rather inconsistently, advocating the legality of assistance to colonial peoples. See generally
Fonteyne, supra note 146, at 220 & nn.87-88.
290. Rolin-Jacquemyns, supra note 59, at 679. Compare, Fonteyne, supra
note 146, at 220; Reisman, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED
NATIONS 24 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
291. Perez-Vera notes that:
En fait, nous sommes en train d'assister h l'effacement progressif du
r6le tenu par l'intervention d'humanit6 au sens classique, au fur et h
mesure que la soci6t6 internationale se d6veloppe dans le sens de sa
propre organisation. . . . Mais seule la tendance est acquise; le but,
c'est-h-dire la mise sur pied d'un v6ritable syst~me de scurit6 collective,
fait encore figure d'id6al lointain; ce n'est qu'au jour de sa r6alisation
que l'intervention d'humanit6, en tant que droit 6tatique, aura vecu.
[E]n attendant cet ordre international nouveau, il reste indispensable
de pr6server-dans les limites que nous avons d6finies-l'intervention
humanitaire. Dans l'6tape de transition otinous sommes, elle apparait
comme le recours ultime li oa les organisations internationales se r6v6lent impuissantes, et ot les m6canismes conventionnels de contr6le ont
6chou6.
Perez-Vera, supra note 139, at 423-24.
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[T]here is deemed to exist a conflict between the defense
of human rights and a consideration of international peace
threatened by such intervention. Historical hindsight proves
that in the long run the conflict is more apparent than real,
for peace is more in danger from tyrannical contempt for
human rights than from attempts to assert, through interven2 92
tion, the sanctity of the human personality.

292. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 132, at 374. Compare LAUTERPACHT,
supra note 125, at 186; M. McDOUGAL & AL., Studies in World Public Order 36061 (1960).
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